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by Caius Julius Caesar

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Title: "De Bello Gallico" and Other Commentaries

Author: Caius Julius Caesar

Release Date: January 9, 2004 [EBook #10657]
[Date last updated: January 23, 2006]

Language: English

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EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY

EDITED BY ERNEST RHYS


CLASSICAL



CAESAR'S COMMENTARIES

TRANSLATED BY W. A. MACDEVITT

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

THOMAS DE QUINCEY


THIS IS NO. 702 OF _EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY_. THE PUBLISHERS WILL BE PLEASED
TO SEND FREELY TO ALL APPLICANTS A LIST OF THE PUBLISHED AND PROJECTED
VOLUMES ARRANGED UNDER THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS:

       *       *       *       *       *

TRAVEL--SCIENCE--FICTION

THEOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY

HISTORY--CLASSICAL

FOR YOUNG PEOPLE

ESSAYS--ORATORY

POETRY & DRAMA

BIOGRAPHY

REFERENCE

ROMANCE

       *       *       *       *       *

THE ORDINARY EDITION IS BOUND IN CLOTH WITH GILT DESIGN AND COLOURED
TOP. THERE IS ALSO A LIBRARY EDITION IN REINFORCED CLOTH




THE SAGES OF OLD LIVE AGAIN IN US

GLANVILL





"DE BELLO GALLICO" & OTHER COMMENTARIES:
OF CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR


FIRST PUBLISHED IN THIS EDITION, 1915
REPRINTED 1923, 1929



INTRODUCTION

BY THOMAS DE QUINCEY

The character of the First Caesar has perhaps never been worse
appreciated than by him who in one sense described it best; that is,
with most force and eloquence wherever he really _did_ comprehend it.
This was Lucan, who has nowhere exhibited more brilliant rhetoric, nor
wandered more from the truth, than in the contrasted portraits of Caesar
and Pompey. The famous line, _"Nil actum reputans si quid superesset
agendum,"_ is a fine feature of the real character, finely expressed.
But, if it had been Lucan's purpose (as possibly, with a view to
Pompey's benefit, in some respects it was) utterly and extravagantly to
falsify the character of the great Dictator, by no single trait could he
more effectually have fulfilled that purpose, nor in fewer words, than
by this expressive passage, _"Gaudensque viam fecisse ruina."_ Such a
trait would be almost extravagant applied even to Marius, who (though in
many respects a perfect model of Roman grandeur, massy, columnar,
imperturbable, and more perhaps than any one man recorded in History
capable of justifying the bold illustration of that character in Horace,
"_Si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae_") had, however,
a ferocity in his character, and a touch of the devil in him, very
rarely united with the same tranquil intrepidity. But, for Caesar, the
all-accomplished statesman, the splendid orator, the man of elegant
habits and polished taste, the patron of the fine arts in a degree
transcending all example of his own or the previous age, and as a man of
general literature so much beyond his contemporaries, except Cicero,
that he looked down even upon the brilliant Sylla as an illiterate
person--to class such a man with the race of furious destroyers exulting
in the desolations they spread is to err not by an individual trait, but
by the whole genus. The Attilas and the Tamerlanes, who rejoice in
avowing themselves the scourges of God, and the special instruments of
his wrath, have no one feature of affinity to the polished and humane
Caesar, and would as little have comprehended his character as he could
have respected theirs. Even Cato, the unworthy hero of Lucan, might have
suggested to him a little more truth in this instance, by a celebrated
remark which he made on the characteristic distinction of Caesar, in
comparison with other revolutionary disturbers; for, said he, whereas
others had attempted the overthrow of the state in a continued paroxysm
of fury, and in a state of mind resembling the lunacy of intoxication,
Caesar, on the contrary, among that whole class of civil disturbers, was
the only one who had come to the task in a temper of sobriety and
moderation _(unum accessisse sobrium ad rempublicam delendam)_....

Great as Caesar was by the benefit of his original nature, there can be
no doubt that he, like others, owed something to circumstances; and
perhaps amongst those which were most favourable to the premature
development of great self-dependence we must reckon the early death of
his father. It is, or it is not, according to the nature of men, an
advantage to be orphaned at as early age. Perhaps utter orphanage is
rarely or never such: but to lose a father betimes may, under
appropriate circumstances, profit a strong mind greatly. To Caesar it
was a prodigious benefit that he lost his father when not much more than
fifteen. Perhaps it was an advantage also to his father that he died
thus early. Had he stayed a year longer, he might have seen himself
despised, baffled, and made ridiculous. For where, let us ask, in any
age, was the father capable of adequately sustaining that relation to
the unique Caius Julius--to him, in the appropriate language of
Shakespeare

  "The foremost man of all this world?"

And, in this fine and Caesarean line, "this world" is to be understood
not of the order of co-existences merely,` but also of the order of
successions; he was the foremost man not only of his contemporaries, but
also, within his own intellectual class, of men generally--of all that
ever should come after him, or should sit on thrones under the
denominations of Czars, Kesars, or Caesars of the Bosphorus and the
Danube; of all in every age that should inherit his supremacy of mind,
or should subject to themselves the generations of ordinary men by
qualities analogous to his. Of this infinite superiority some part must
be ascribed to his early emancipation from paternal control. There are
very many cases in which, simply from considerations of sex, a female
cannot stand forward as the head of a family, or as its suitable
representative. If they are even ladies paramount, and in situations of
command, they are also women. The staff of authority does not annihilate
their sex; and scruples of female delicacy interfere for ever to unnerve
and emasculate in their hands the sceptre however otherwise potent.
Hence we see, in noble families, the merest boys put forward to
represent the family dignity, as fitter supporters of that burden than
their mature mothers. And of Caesar's mother, though little is recorded,
and that little incidentally, this much at least we learn--that, if she
looked down upon him with maternal pride and delight, she looked up to
him with female ambition as the re-edifier of her husband's honours,--
looked with reverence as to a column of the Roman grandeur and with fear
and feminine anxieties as to one whose aspiring spirit carried him but
too prematurely into the fields of adventurous strife. One slight and
evanescent sketch of the relations which subsisted between Caesar and
his mother, caught from the wrecks of time, is preserved both by
Plutarch and Suetonius. We see in the early dawn the young patrician
standing upon the steps of his patrimonial portico, his mother with her
arms wreathed about his neck, looking up to his noble countenance,
sometimes drawing auguries of hope from features so fitted for command,
sometimes boding an early blight to promises so dangerously magnificent.
That she had something of her son's aspiring character, or that he
presumed so much in a mother of his, we learn from the few words which
survive of their conversation. He addressed to her no language that
could tranquillise her fears. On the contrary, to any but a Roman mother
his valedictory words, taken in connexion with the known determination
of his character, were of a nature to consummate her depression, as they
tended to confirm the very worst of her fears. He was then going to
stand his chance in a popular electioneering contest for an office of
the highest dignity, and to launch himself upon the storms of the Campus
Martius. At that period, besides other and more ordinary dangers, the
bands of gladiators, kept in the pay of the more ambitious or turbulent
amongst the Roman nobles, gave a popular tone of ferocity and of
personal risk to the course of such contests; and, either to forestall
the victory of an antagonist, or to avenge their own defeat, it was not
at all impossible that a body of incensed competitors might intercept
his final triumph by assassination. For this danger, however, he had no
leisure in his thoughts of consolation; the sole danger which _he_
contemplated, or supposed his mother to contemplate, was the danger of
defeat, and for that he reserved his consolations. He bade her fear
nothing; for that his determination was to return with victory, and with
the ensigns of the dignity he sought, or to return a corpse.

Early indeed did Caesar's trials commence; and it is probable, that, had
not the death of his father, by throwing him prematurely upon his own
resources, prematurely developed the masculine features of his
character, forcing him whilst yet a boy under the discipline of civil
conflict and the yoke of practical life, even _his_ energies might have
been insufficient to sustain them. His age is not exactly ascertained;
but it is past a doubt that he had not reached his twentieth year when
he had the hardihood to engage in a struggle with Sylla, then Dictator,
and exercising the immoderate powers of that office with the licence and
the severity which History has made so memorable. He had neither any
distinct grounds of hope, nor any eminent example at that time, to
countenance him in this struggle--which yet he pushed on in the most
uncompromising style, and to the utmost verge of defiance. The subject
of the contest gives it a further interest. It was the youthful wife of
the youthful Caesar who stood under the shadow of the great Dictator's
displeasure; not personally, but politically, on account of her
connexions: and her it was, Cornelia, the daughter of a man who had been
four times consul, that Caesar was required to divorce: but he spurned
the haughty mandate, and carried his determination to a triumphant
issue, notwithstanding his life was at stake, and at one time saved only
by shifting his place of concealment every night; and this young lady it
was who afterwards became the mother of his only daughter. Both mother
and daughter, it is remarkable, perished prematurely, and at critical
periods of Caesar's life; for it is probable enough that these
irreparable wounds to Caesar's domestic affections threw him with more
exclusiveness of devotion upon the fascinations of glory and ambition
than might have happened under a happier condition of his private life.
That Caesar should have escaped destruction in this unequal contest with
an enemy then wielding the whole thunders of the state, is somewhat
surprising; and historians have sought their solution of the mystery in
the powerful intercessions of the vestal virgins, and several others of
high rank amongst the connexions of his great house. These may have done
something; but it is due to Sylla, who had a sympathy with everything
truly noble, to suppose him struck with powerful admiration for the
audacity of the young patrician, standing out in such severe solitude
among so many examples of timid concession; and that to this magnanimous
feeling in the Dictator much of the indulgence which he showed may have
been really due. In fact, according to some accounts, it was not Sylla,
but the creatures of Sylla (_adjutores_), who pursued Caesar. We know,
at all events, that Sylla formed a right estimate of Caesar's character,
and that, from the complexion of his conduct in this one instance, he
drew that famous prophecy of his future destiny; bidding his friends
beware of that slipshod boy, "for that in him lay couchant many a
Marius." A grander testimony to the awe which Caesar inspired, or from
one who knew better the qualities of that Cyclopean man by whose scale
he measured the patrician boy, cannot be imagined.

It is not our intention, or consistent with our plan, to pursue this
great man through the whole circumstances of his romantic career; though
it is certain that many parts of his life require investigation much
keener than has ever been applied to them, and that many might be placed
in a new light. Indeed, the whole of this most momentous section of
ancient history ought to be recomposed with the critical scepticism of a
Niebuhr, and the same comprehensive collation, resting, if possible, on
the felicitous interpretation of authorities. In reality it is the hinge
upon which turned the future destiny of the whole earth, and, having
therefore a common relation to all modern nations whatsoever, should
naturally have been cultivated with the zeal which belongs to a personal
concern. In general, the anecdotes which express most vividly the
grandeur of character in the first Caesar are those which illustrate his
defiance of danger in extremity: the prodigious energy and rapidity of
his decisions and motions in the field (looking to which it was that
Cicero called him [Greek: teras] or portentous revelation); the skill
with which he penetrated the designs of his enemies, and the electric
speed with which he met disasters with remedy and reparation, or, where
that was impossible, with relief; the extraordinary presence of mind
which he showed in turning adverse omens to his own advantage, as when,
upon stumbling in coming on shore (which was esteemed a capital omen of
evil), he transfigured as it were in one instant its whole meaning by
exclaiming, "Thus, and by this contact with the earth, do I take
possession of thee, O Africa!" in that way giving to an accident the
semblance of a symbolic purpose. Equally conspicuous was the grandeur of
fortitude with which he faced the whole extent of a calamity when
palliation could do no good, "non negando, minuendove, sed insuper
amplificando, _ementiendoque_"; as when, upon finding his soldiery
alarmed at the approach of Juba, with forces really great, but
exaggerated by their terrors, he addressed them in a military harangue
to the following effect:--"Know that within a few days the king will
come up with us, bringing with him sixty thousand legionaries, thirty
thousand cavalry, one hundred thousand light troops, besides three
hundred elephants. Such being the case, let me hear no more of
conjectures and opinions, for you have now my warrant for the fact,
whose information is past doubting. Therefore, be satisfied; otherwise,
I will put every man of you on board some crazy old fleet, and whistle
you down the tide--no matter under what winds, no matter towards what
shore." Finally, we might seek for _characteristic_ anecdotes of Caesar
in his unexampled liberalities and contempt of money.

Upon this last topic it is the just remark of Casaubon that some
instances of Caesar's munificence have been thought apocryphal, or to
rest upon false readings, simply from ignorance of the heroic scale upon
which the Roman splendours of that age proceeded. A forum which Caesar
built out of the products of his last campaign, by way of a present to
the Roman people, cost him--for the ground merely on which it stood--
nearly eight hundred thousand pounds. To the citizens of Rome he
presented, in one _congiary_, about two guineas and a half a head. To
his army, in one _donation_, upon the termination of the Civil War, he
gave a sum which allowed about two hundred pounds a man to the infantry,
and four hundred to the cavalry. It is true that the legionary troops
were then much reduced by the sword of the enemy, and by the tremendous
hardships of their last campaigns. In this, however, he did perhaps no
more than repay a debt. For it is an instance of military attachment,
beyond all that Wallenstein or any commander, the most beloved amongst
his troops, has ever experienced, that, on the breaking out of the Civil
War, not only did the centurions of every legion severally maintain a
horse soldier, but even the privates volunteered to serve without pay,
and (what might seem impossible) without their daily rations. This was
accomplished by subscriptions amongst themselves, the more opulent
undertaking for the maintenance of the needy. Their disinterested love
for Caesar appeared in another and more difficult illustration: it was a
traditionary anecdote in Rome that the majority of those amongst
Caesar's troops who had the misfortune to fall into the enemy's hands
refused to accept their lives under the condition of serving against
_him_.

In connexion with this subject of his extraordinary munificence, there
is one aspect of Caesar's life which has suffered much from the
misrepresentations of historians, and that is--the vast pecuniary
embarrassments under which he laboured, until the profits of war had
turned the scale even more prodigiously in his favour. At one time of
his life, when appointed to a foreign office, so numerous and so
clamorous were his creditors that he could not have left Rome on his
public duties had not Crassus come forward with assistance in money, or
by guarantees, to the amount of nearly two hundred thousand pounds. And
at another he was accustomed to amuse himself with computing how much
money it would require to make him worth exactly nothing (_i.e._ simply
to clear him of debts); this, by one account, amounted to upwards of two
millions sterling. Now, the error of historians has been to represent
these debts as the original ground of his ambition and his revolutionary
projects, as though the desperate condition of his private affairs had
suggested a civil war to his calculations as the best or only mode of
redressing it. Such a policy would have resembled the last desperate
resource of an unprincipled gambler, who, on seeing his final game at
chess, and the accumulated stakes depending upon it, all on the brink of
irretrievable sacrifice, dexterously upsets the chess-board, or
extinguishes the lights. But Julius, the one sole patriot of Rome, could
find no advantage to his plans in darkness or in confusion. Honestly
supported, he would have crushed the oligarchies of Rome by crushing in
its lairs that venal and hunger-bitten democracy which made oligarchy
and its machineries resistless. Caesar's debts, far from being
stimulants and exciting causes of his political ambition, stood in an
inverse relation to the ambition; they were its results, and represented
its natural costs, being contracted from first to last in the service of
his political intrigues, for raising and maintaining a powerful body of
partisans, both in Rome and elsewhere. Whosoever indeed will take the
trouble to investigate the progress of Caesar's ambition, from such
materials as even yet remain, may satisfy himself that the scheme of
revolutionizing the Republic, and placing himself at its head, was no
growth of accident or circumstances; above all, that it did not arise
upon any so petty and indirect a suggestion as that of his debts; but
that his debts were in their very first origin purely ministerial to his
wise, indispensable, and patriotic ambition; and that his revolutionary
plans were at all periods of his life a direct and foremost object, but
in no case bottomed upon casual impulses. In this there was not only
patriotism, but in fact the one sole mode of patriotism which could have
prospered, or could have found a field of action.

Chatter not, sublime reader, commonplaces of scoundrel moralists against
ambition. In some cases ambition is a hopeful virtue; in others (as in
the Rome of our resplendent Julius) ambition was the virtue by which any
other could flourish. It had become evident to everybody that Rome,
under its present constitution, must fall; and the sole question was--by
whom? Even Pompey, not by nature of an aspiring turn, and prompted to
his ambitious course undoubtedly by circumstances and, the friends who
besieged him, was in the habit of saying, "Sylla potuit: ego non
potero?" _Sylla found it possible: shall I find it not so?_ Possible to
do what? To overthrow the political system of the Republic. This had
silently collapsed into an order of things so vicious, growing also so
hopelessly worse, that all honest patriots invoked a purifying
revolution, even though bought at the heavy price of a tyranny, rather
than face the chaos of murderous distractions to which the tide of feuds
and frenzies was violently tending.

Such a revolution at such a price was not less Pompey's object than
Caesar's. In a case, therefore, where no benefit of choice was allowed
to Rome as respected the thing, but only as respected the person, Caesar
had the same right to enter the arena in the character of combatant as
could belong to any one of his rivals. And that he _did_ enter that
arena constructively, and by secret design, from his very earliest
manhood, may be gathered from this--that he suffered no openings towards
a revolution, provided they had any hope in them, to escape his
participation. It is familiarly known that he was engaged pretty deeply
in the conspiracy of Catiline, and that he incurred considerable risk on
that occasion; but it is less known that he was a party to at least two
other conspiracies. There was even a fourth, meditated by Crassus, which
Caesar so far encouraged as to undertake a journey to Rome from a very
distant quarter merely with a view to such chances as it might offer to
him; but, as it did not, upon examination, seem to him a very promising
scheme, he judged it best to look coldly upon it, or not to embark in it
by any personal co-operation. Upon these and other facts we build our
inference--that the scheme of a revolution was the one great purpose of
Caesar from his first entrance upon public life. Nor does it appear that
he cared much by whom it was undertaken, provided only there seemed to
be any sufficient resources for carrying it through, and for sustaining
the first collision with the regular forces of the existing oligarchies,
taking or _not_ taking the shape of triumvirates. He relied, it seems,
on his own personal superiority for raising him to the head of affairs
eventually, let who would take the nominal lead at first.

To the same result, it will be found, tended the vast stream of Caesar's
liberalities. From the senator downwards to the lowest _faex Romuli_, he
had a hired body of dependents, both in and out of Rome, equal in
numbers to a nation. In the provinces, and in distant kingdoms, he
pursued the same schemes. Everywhere he had a body of mercenary
partisans; kings even are known to have taken his pay. And it is
remarkable that even in his character of commander-in-chief, where the
number of legions allowed to him for the accomplishment of his Gaulish
mission raised him for a number of years above all fear of coercion or
control, he persevered steadily in the same plan of providing for the
distant day when he might need assistance, not _from_ the state, but
_against_ the state. For, amongst the private anecdotes which came to
light under the researches made into his history after his death, was
this--that, soon after his first entrance upon his government in Gaul,
he had raised, equipped, disciplined, and maintained, from his own
private funds, a legion amounting, possibly, to six or seven thousand
men, who were bound to no sacrament of military obedience to the state,
nor owed fealty to any auspices except those of Caesar. This legion,
from the fashion of their crested helmets, which resembled the heads of
a small aspiring bird, received the popular name of the _Alauda_ (or
Lark) legion. And very singular it was that Cato, or Marcellus, or some
amongst those enemies of Caesar who watched his conduct during the
period of his Gaulish command with the vigilance of rancorous malice,
should not have come to the knowledge of this fact; in which case we may
be sure that it would have been denounced to the Senate.

Such, then, for its purpose and its uniform motive, was the sagacious
munificence of Caesar. Apart from this motive, and considered in and for
itself, and simply with a reference to the splendid forms which it often
assumed, this munificence would furnish the materials for a volume. The
public entertainments of Caesar, his spectacles and shows, his
naumachiae, and the pomps of his unrivalled triumphs (the closing
triumphs of the Republic), were severally the finest of their kind which
had then been brought forward. Sea-fights were exhibited upon the
grandest scale, according to every known variety of nautical equipment
and mode of conflict, upon a vast lake formed artificially for that
express purpose. Mimic land-fights were conducted, in which all the
circumstances of real war were so faithfully rehearsed that even
elephants "indorsed with towers," twenty on each side, took part in the
combat. Dramas were represented in every known language (_per omnium
linguarum histriones_). And hence (that is, from the conciliatory
feeling thus expressed towards the various tribes of foreigners resident
in Rome) some have derived an explanation of what is else a mysterious
circumstance amongst the ceremonial observances at Caesar's funeral--
that all people of foreign nations then residing at Rome distinguished
themselves by the conspicuous share which they took in the public
mourning; and that, beyond all other foreigners, the Jews for night
after night kept watch and ward about the Emperor's grave. Never before,
according to traditions which lasted through several generations in
Rome, had there been so vast a conflux of the human race congregated to
any one centre, on any one attraction of business or of pleasure, as to
Rome on occasion of these triumphal spectacles exhibited by Caesar.

In our days, the greatest occasional gatherings of the human race are in
India, especially at the great fair of the _Hurdwar_ on the Ganges in
northern Hindustan: a confluence of some millions is sometimes seen at
that spot, brought together under the mixed influences of devotion and
commercial business, but very soon dispersed as rapidly as they had been
convoked. Some such spectacle of nations crowding upon nations, and some
such Babylonian confusion of dresses, complexions, languages, and
jargons, was then witnessed at Rome. Accommodations within doors, and
under roofs of houses, or roofs of temples, was altogether impossible.
Myriads encamped along the streets, and along the high-roads, fields, or
gardens. Myriads lay stretched on the ground, without even the slight
protection of tents, in a vast circuit about the city. Multitudes of
men, even senators, and others of the highest rank, were trampled to
death in the crowds. And the whole family of man might seem at that time
to be converged at the bidding of the dead Dictator. But these, or any
other themes connected with the public life of Caesar, we notice only in
those circumstances which have been overlooked, or partially
represented, by historians. Let us now, in conclusion, bring forward,
from the obscurity in which they have hitherto lurked, the anecdotes
which describe the habits of his private life, his tastes, and personal
peculiarities.

In person, he was tall, fair, gracile, and of limbs distinguished for
their elegant proportions. His eyes were black and piercing. These
circumstances continued to be long remembered, and no doubt were
constantly recalled to the eyes of all persons in the imperial palaces
by pictures, busts, and statues; for we find the same description of his
personal appearance three centuries afterwards in a work of the Emperor
Julian's. He was a most accomplished horseman, and a master
(_peritissimus_) in the use of arms. But, notwithstanding his skill and
horsemanship, it seems that, when he accompanied his army on marches, he
walked oftener than he rode; no doubt, with a view to the benefit of his
example, and to express that sympathy with his soldiers which gained him
their hearts so entirely. On other occasions, when travelling apart from
his army, he seems more frequently to have ridden in a carriage than on
horseback. His purpose, in this preference, must have been with a view
to the transport of luggage. The carriage which he generally used was a
_rheda_, a sort of gig, or rather curricle; for it was a _four_-wheeled
carriage, and adapted (as we find from the imperial regulations for the
public carriages, etc.) to the conveyance of about half a ton. The mere
personal baggage which Caesar carried with him was probably
considerable; for he was a man of elegant habits, and in all parts of
his life sedulously attentive to elegance of personal appearance. The
length of journeys which he accomplished within a given time appears
even to us at this day, and might well therefore appear to his
contemporaries, truly astonishing. A distance of one hundred miles was
no extraordinary day's journey for him in a _rheda_, such as we have
described it. So refined were his habits, and so constant his demand for
the luxurious accommodations of polished life as it then existed in
Rome, that he is said to have carried with him, as indispensable parts
of his personal baggage, the little ivory lozenges, squares and circles
or ovals, with other costly materials, wanted for the tessellated
flooring of his tent. Habits such as these will easily account for his
travelling in a carriage rather than on horseback.

The courtesy and obliging disposition of Caesar were notorious; and both
were illustrated in some anecdotes which survived for generations in
Rome. Dining on one occasion, as an invited guest, at a table where the
servants had inadvertently, for salad-oil, furnished some sort of coarse
lamp-oil, Caesar would not allow the rest of the company to point out
the mistake to their host, for fear of shocking him too much by exposing
what might have been construed into inhospitality. At another time,
whilst halting at a little _cabaret_, when one of his retinue was
suddenly taken ill, Caesar resigned to his use the sole bed which the
house afforded. Incidents as trifling as these express the urbanity of
Caesar's nature; and hence one is the more surprised to find the
alienation of the Senate charged, in no trifling degree, upon a gross
and most culpable failure in point of courtesy. Caesar, it is alleged--
but might we presume to call upon antiquity for its authority?--
neglected to rise from his seat, on their approaching him with an
address of congratulation. It is said, and we can believe it, that he
gave deeper offence by this one defect in a matter of ceremonial
observance than by all his substantial attacks upon their privileges.
What we find it difficult to believe is not that result from that
offence--this is no more than we should all anticipate--not _that_, but
the possibility of the offence itself, from one so little arrogant as
Caesar, and so entirely a man of the world. He was told of the disgust
which he had given; and we are bound to believe his apology, in which he
charged it upon sickness, that would not at the moment allow him to
maintain a standing attitude. Certainly the whole tenor of his life was
not courteous only, but kind, and to his enemies merciful in a degree
which implied so much more magnanimity than men in general could
understand that by many it was put down to the account of weakness.

Weakness, however, there was none in Caius Caesar; and, that there might
be none, it was fortunate that conspiracy should have cut him off in the
full vigour of his faculties, in the very meridian of his glory, and on
the brink of completing a series of gigantic achievements. Amongst these
are numbered:--a digest of the entire body of laws, even then become
unwieldy and oppressive; the establishment of vast and comprehensive
public libraries, Greek as well as Latin; the chastisement of Dacia
(that needed a cow-hiding for insolence as much as Affghanistan from us
in 1840); the conquest of Parthia; and the cutting a ship canal through
the Isthmus of Corinth. The reformation of the Calendar he had already
accomplished. And of all his projects it may be said that they were
equally patriotic in their purpose and colossal in their proportions.

As an orator, Caesar's merit was so eminent that, according to the
general belief, had he found time to cultivate this department of civil
exertion, the received supremacy of Cicero would have been made
questionable, or the honour would have been divided. Cicero himself was
of that opinion, and on different occasions applied the epithet
_splendidus_ to Caesar, as though in some exclusive sense, or with some
peculiar emphasis, due to him. His taste was much simpler, chaster, and
less inclined to the _florid_ and Asiatic, than that of Cicero. So far
he would, in that condition of the Roman culture and feeling, have been
less acceptable to the public; but, on the other hand, he would have
compensated this disadvantage by much more of natural and Demosthenic
fervour.

In literature, the merits of Caesar are familiar to most readers. Under
the modest title of _Commentaries_, he meant to offer the records of his
Gallic and British campaigns, simply as notes, or memoranda, afterwards
to be worked up by regular historians; but, as Cicero observes, their
merit was such in the eyes of the discerning that all judicious writers
shrank from the attempt to alter them. In another instance of his
literary labours he showed a very just sense of true dignity. Rightly
conceiving that everything patriotic was dignified, and that to
illustrate or polish his native language was a service of real and
paramount patriotism, he composed a work on the grammar and orthoepy of
the Latin language. Cicero and himself were the only Romans of
distinction in that age who applied themselves with true patriotism to
the task of purifying and ennobling their mother tongue. Both were aware
of a transcendent value in the Grecian literature as it then stood; but
that splendour did not depress their hopes of raising their own to
something of the same level. As respected the natural wealth of the two
languages, it was the private opinion of Cicero that the Latin had the
advantage; and, if Caesar did not accompany him to that length--which,
perhaps, under some limitations he ought to have done--he yet felt that
it was but the more necessary to draw forth any special or exceptional
advantage which it really had.

Was Caesar, upon the whole, the greatest of men? We restrict the
question, of course, to the classes of men great in _action_: great by
the extent of their influence over their social contemporaries; great by
throwing open avenues to extended powers that previously had been
closed; great by making obstacles once vast to become trivial, or prizes
that once were trivial to be glorified by expansion. I (said Augustus
Caesar) found Rome built of brick; but I left it built of marble. Well,
my man, we reply, for a wondrously little chap, you did what in
Westmoreland they call a good _darroch_ (day's work); and, if _navvies_
had been wanted in those days, you should have had our vote to a
certainty. But Caius Julius, even under such a limitation of the
comparison, did a thing as much transcending this as it was greater to
project Rome across the Alps and the Pyrenees,--expanding the grand
Republic into crowning provinces of i. France (_Gallia_), 2. Belgium, 3.
Holland (_Batavia_), 4. England (_Britannia_), 5. Savoy (_Allobroges_),
6. Switzerland (_Helvetia_), 7. Spain (_Hispania_),--than to decorate a
street or to found an amphitheatre. Dr. Beattie once observed that, if
that question as to the greatest man in action upon the rolls of History
were left to be collected from the suffrages already expressed in books
and scattered throughout the literature of all nations, the scale would
be found to have turned prodigiously in Caesar's favour as against any
single competitor; and there is no doubt whatsoever that even amongst
his own countrymen, and his own contemporaries, the same verdict would
have been returned, had it been collected upon the famous principle of
Themistocles, that he should be reputed the first whom the greatest
number of rival voices had pronounced to be the second.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

_Works_: Latin folio, Rome, 1469; Venice, 1471; Florence, 1514; London,
1585. De Bello Gallico, Esslingen (?), 1473. Translations by John
Tiptoft, Earl of Worcester (John Rastell), of Julius Caesar's
Commentaries-"newly translated into Englyshe ... as much as concerneth
thys realme of England"--1530 folio; by Arthur Goldinge, The Eyght
Bookes of C. Julius Caesar, London, 1563, 1565, 1578, 1590; by Chapman,
London, 1604 folio; by Clem. Edmonds, London, 1609; the same, with
Hirtius, 1655, 1670, 1695 folio with commendatory verses by Camden,
Daniel, and Ben Johnson (_sic_). Works: Translated by W. Duncan, 1753,
1755; by M. Bladen, 8th ed., 1770; MacDevitt, Bohn's Library, 1848. De
Bello Gallico, translated by R. Mongan, Dublin, 1850; by J.B. Owgan and
C.W. Bateman, 1882. Caesar's Commentaries on the Gallic War, translated
by T. Rice Holmes, London, 1908 (see also Holmes' Caesar's Conquest of
Gaul, 1911). Caesar's Gallic War, translated by Rev. F.P. Long, Oxford,
1911; Books IV. and V. translated by C.H. Prichard, Cambridge, 1912. For
Latin text of De Bello Gallico see Bell's Illustrated Classical Series;
Dent's Temple Series of Classical Texts, 1902; Macmillan and Co., 1905;
and Blackie's Latin Texts, 1905-7.


       *       *       *       *       *


CONTENTS


THE WAR IN GAUL

THE CIVIL WAR





THE COMMENTARIES OF
CAIUS JULIUS CAESAR


THE WAR IN GAUL

BOOK I

I.--All Gaul is divided into three parts, one of which the Belgae
inhabit, the Aquitani another, those who in their own language are
called Celts, in ours Gauls, the third. All these differ from each other
in language, customs and laws. The river Garonne separates the Gauls
from the Aquitani; the Marne and the Seine separate them from the
Belgae. Of all these, the Belgae are the bravest, because they are
farthest from the civilisation and refinement of [our] Province, and
merchants least frequently resort to them and import those things which
tend to effeminate the mind; and they are the nearest to the Germans,
who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually waging war;
for which reason the Helvetii also surpass the rest of the Gauls in
valour, as they contend with the Germans in almost daily battles, when
they either repel them from their own territories, or themselves wage
war on their frontiers. One part of these, which it has been said that
the Gauls occupy, takes its beginning at the river Rhone: it is bounded
by the river Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgae: it
borders, too, on the side of the Sequani and the Helvetii, upon the
river Rhine, and stretches towards the north. The Belgae rise from the
extreme frontier of Gaul, extend to the lower part of the river Rhine;
and look towards the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from
the river Garonne to the Pyrenaean mountains and to that part of the
ocean which is near Spain: it looks between the setting of the sun and
the north star.

II.--Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix was by far the most distinguished and
wealthy. He, when Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso were consuls, incited
by lust of sovereignty, formed a conspiracy among the nobility, and
persuaded the people to go forth from their territories with all their
possessions, [saying] that it would be very easy, since they excelled
all in valour, to acquire the supremacy of the whole of Gaul. To this he
the more easily persuaded them, because the Helvetii are confined on
every side by the nature of their situation; on one side by the Rhine, a
very broad and deep river, which separates the Helvetian territory from
the Germans; on a second side by the Jura, a very high mountain which is
[situated] between the Sequani and the Helvetii; on a third by the Lake
of Geneva, and by the river Rhone, which separates our Province from the
Helvetii. From these circumstances it resulted that they could range
less widely, and could less easily make war upon their neighbours; for
which reason men fond of war [as they were] were affected with great
regret. They thought, that considering the extent of their population,
and their renown for warfare and bravery, they had but narrow limits,
although they extended in length 240, and in breadth 180 [Roman] miles.

III.--Induced by these considerations, and influenced by the authority
of Orgetorix, they determined to provide such things as were necessary
for their expedition--to buy up as great a number as possible of beasts
of burden and waggons--to make their sowings as large as possible, so
that on their march plenty of corn might be in store--and to establish
peace and friendship with the neighbouring states. They reckoned that a
term of two years would be sufficient for them to execute their designs;
they fix by decree their departure for the third year. Orgetorix is
chosen to complete these arrangements. He took upon himself the office
of ambassador to the states: on this journey he persuades Casticus, the
son of Catamantaledes (one of the Sequani, whose father had possessed
the sovereignty among the people for many years, and had been styled
"_friend_" by the senate of the Roman people), to seize upon the
sovereignty in his own state, which his father had held before him, and
he likewise persuades Dumnorix, an Aeduan, the brother of Divitiacus,
who at that time possessed the chief authority in the state, and was
exceedingly beloved by the people, to attempt the same, and gives him
his daughter in marriage. He proves to them that to accomplish their
attempts was a thing very easy to be done, because he himself would
obtain the government of his own state; that there was no doubt that the
Helvetii were the most powerful of the whole of Gaul; he assures them
that he will, with his own forces and his own army, acquire the
sovereignty for them. Incited by this speech, they give a pledge and
oath to one another, and hope that, when they have seized the
sovereignty, they will, by means of the three most powerful and valiant
nations, be enabled to obtain possession of the whole of Gaul.

IV.--When this scheme was disclosed to the Helvetii by informers, they,
according to their custom, compelled Orgetorix to plead his cause in
chains; it was the law that the penalty of being burned by fire should
await him if condemned. On the day appointed for the pleading of his
cause, Orgetorix drew together from all quarters to the court all his
vassals to the number of ten thousand persons; and led together to the
same place, and all his dependants and debtor-bondsmen, of whom he had a
great number; by means of these he rescued himself from [the necessity
of] pleading his cause. While the state, incensed at this act, was
endeavouring to assert its right by arms, and the magistrates were
mustering a large body of men from the country, Orgetorix died; and
there is not wanting a suspicion, as the Helvetii think, of his having
committed suicide.

V.--After his death, the Helvetii nevertheless attempt to do that which
they had resolved on, namely, to go forth from their territories. When
they thought that they were at length prepared for this undertaking,
they set fire to all their towns, in number about twelve--to their
villages about four hundred--and to the private dwellings that remained;
they burn up all the corn, except what they intend to carry with them;
that after destroying the hope of a return home, they might be the more
ready for undergoing all dangers. They order every one to carry forth
from home for himself provisions for three months, ready ground. They
persuade the Rauraci, and the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, their
neighbours, to adopt the same plan, and after burning down their towns
and villages, to set out with them: and they admit to their party and
unite to themselves as confederates the Boii, who had dwelt on the other
side of the Rhine, and had crossed over into the Norican territory, and
assaulted Noreia.

VI.--There were in all two routes by which they could go forth from
their country--one through the Sequani, narrow and difficult, between
Mount Jura and the river Rhone (by which scarcely one waggon at a time
could be led; there was, moreover, a very high mountain overhanging, so
that a very few might easily intercept them); the other, through our
Province, much easier and freer from obstacles, because the Rhone flows
between the boundaries of the Helvetii and those of the Allobroges, who
had lately been subdued, and is in some places crossed by a ford. The
furthest town of the Allobroges, and the nearest to the territories of
the Helvetii, is Geneva. From this town a bridge extends to the
Helvetii. They thought that they should either persuade the Allobroges,
because they did not seem as yet well-affected towards the Roman people,
or compel them by force to allow them to pass through their territories.
Having provided everything for the expedition, they appoint a day on
which they should all meet on the bank of the Rhone. This day was the
fifth before the kalends of April [_i.e._ the 28th of March], in the
consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius [B.C. 58].

VII.--When it was reported to Caesar that they were attempting to make
their route through our Province, he hastens to set out from the city,
and, by as great marches as he can, proceeds to Further Gaul, and
arrives at Geneva. He orders the whole Province [to furnish] as great a
number of soldiers as possible, as there was in all only one legion in
Further Gaul: he orders the bridge at Geneva to be broken down. When the
Helvetii are apprised of his arrival, they send to him, as ambassadors,
the most illustrious men of their state (in which embassy Numeius and
Verudoctius held the chief place), to say "that it was their intention
to march through the Province without doing any harm, because they had"
[according to their own representations] "no other route:--that they
requested they might be allowed to do so with his consent." Caesar,
inasmuch as he kept in remembrance that Lucius Cassius, the consul, had
been slain, and his army routed and made to pass under the yoke by the
Helvetii, did not think that [their request] ought to be granted; nor
was he of opinion that men of hostile disposition, if an opportunity of
marching through the Province were given them, would abstain from
outrage and mischief. Yet, in order that a period might intervene, until
the soldiers whom he had ordered [to be furnished] should assemble, he
replied to the ambassadors, that he would take time to deliberate; if
they wanted anything, they might return on the day before the ides of
April [on April 12th].

VIII.--Meanwhile, with the legion which he had with him and the soldiers
who had assembled from the Province, he carries along for nineteen
[Roman, not quite eighteen English] miles a wall, to the height of
sixteen feet, and a trench, from the lake of Geneva, which flows into
the river Rhone, to Mount Jura, which separates the territories of the
Sequani from those of the Helvetii. When that work was finished, he
distributes garrisons, and closely fortifies redoubts, in order that he
may the more easily intercept them, if they should attempt to cross over
against his will. When the day which he had appointed with the
ambassadors came, and they returned to him, he says that he cannot,
consistently with the custom and precedent of the Roman people, grant
any one a passage through the Province; and he gives them to understand
that, if they should attempt to use violence, he would oppose them. The
Helvetii, disappointed in this hope, tried if they could force a passage
(some by means of a bridge of boats and numerous rafts constructed for
the purpose; others, by the fords of the Rhone, where the depth of the
river was least, sometimes by day, but more frequently by night), but
being kept at bay by the strength of our works, and by the concourse of
the soldiers, and by the missiles, they desisted from this attempt.

IX.--There was left one way, [namely] through the Sequani, by which, on
account of its narrowness, they could not pass without the consent of
the Sequani. As they could not of themselves prevail on them, they send
ambassadors to Dumnorix the Aeduan, that through his intercession they
might obtain their request from the Sequani. Dumnorix, by his popularity
and liberality, had great influence among the Sequani, and was friendly
to the Helvetii, because out of that state he had married the daughter
of Orgetorix; and, incited by lust of sovereignty, was anxious for a
revolution, and wished to have as many states as possible attached to
him by his kindness towards them. He, therefore, undertakes the affair,
and prevails upon the Sequani to allow the Helvetii to march through
their territories, and arranges that they should give hostages to each
other--the Sequani not to obstruct the Helvetii in their march--the
Helvetii, to pass without mischief and outrage.

X.--It-is again told Caesar that the Helvetii intend to march through
the country of the Sequani and the Aedui into the territories of the
Santones, which are not far distant from those boundaries of the
Tolosates, which [viz. Tolosa, Toulouse] is a state in the Province. If
this took place, he saw that it would be attended with great danger to
the Province to have warlike men, enemies of the Roman people, bordering
upon an open and very fertile tract of country. For these reasons he
appointed Titus Labienus, his lieutenant, to the command of the
fortification which he had made. He himself proceeds to Italy by forced
marches, and there levies two legions, and leads out from winter-quarters
three which were wintering around Aquileia, and with these five
legions marches rapidly by the nearest route across the Alps into
Further Gaul. Here the Centrones and the Graioceli and the Caturiges,
having taken possession of the higher parts, attempt to obstruct the
army in their march. After having routed these in several battles, he
arrives in the territories of the Vocontii in the Further Province on
the seventh day from Ocelum, which is the most remote town of the Hither
Province; thence he leads his army into the country of the Allobroges,
and from the Allobroges to the Segusiani. These people are the first
beyond the Province on the opposite side of the Rhone.

XI.--The Helvetii had by this time led their forces over through the
narrow defile and the territories of the Sequani, and had arrived at the
territories of the Aedui, and were ravaging their lands. The Aedui, as
they could not defend themselves and their possessions against them,
send ambassadors to Caesar to ask assistance, [pleading] that they had
at all times so well deserved of the Roman people, that their fields
ought not to have been laid waste--their children carried off into
slavery--their towns stormed, almost within sight of our army. At the
same time the Ambarri, the friends and kinsmen of the Aedui, apprise
Caesar that it was not easy for them, now that their fields had been
devastated, to ward off the violence of the enemy from their towns: the
Allobroges likewise, who had villages and possessions on the other side
of the Rhone, betake themselves in flight to Caesar and assure him that
they had nothing remaining, except the soil of their land. Caesar,
induced by these circumstances, decides that he ought not to wait until
the Helvetii, after destroying all the property of his allies, should
arrive among the Santones.

XII.--There is a river [called] the Saone, which flows through the
territories of the Aedui and Sequani into the Rhone with such incredible
slowness, that it cannot be determined by the eye in which direction it
flows. This the Helvetii were crossing by rafts and boats joined
together. When Caesar was informed by spies that the Helvetii had
already conveyed three parts of their forces across that river, but that
the fourth part was left behind on this side of the Saone, he set out
from the camp with three legions during the third watch, and came up
with that division which had not yet crossed the river. Attacking them,
encumbered with baggage, and not expecting him, he cut to pieces a great
part of them; the rest betook themselves to flight, and concealed
themselves in the nearest woods. That canton [which was cut down] was
called the Tigurine; for the whole Helvetian state is divided into four
cantons. This single canton having left their country, within the
recollection of our fathers, had slain Lucius Cassius the consul, and
had made his army pass under the yoke [B.C. 107]. Thus, whether by
chance, or by the design of the immortal gods, that part of the
Helvetian state which had brought a signal calamity upon the Roman
people was the first to pay the penalty. In this Caesar avenged not only
the public, but also his own personal wrongs, because the Tigurini had
slain Lucius Piso the lieutenant [of Cassius], the grandfather of Lucius
Calpurnius Piso, his [Caesar's] father-in-law, in the same battle as
Cassius himself.

XIII.--This battle ended, that he might be able to come up with the
remaining forces of the Helvetii, he procures a bridge to be made across
the Saone, and thus leads his army over. The Helvetii, confused by his
sudden arrival, when they found that he had effected in one day what
they themselves had with the utmost difficulty accomplished in twenty,
namely, the crossing of the river, send ambassadors to him; at the head
of which embassy was Divico, who had been commander of the Helvetii in
the war against Cassius. He thus treats with Caesar:--that, "if the
Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii they would go to that
part and there remain, where Caesar might appoint and desire them to be;
but if he should persist in persecuting them with war, that he ought to
remember both the ancient disgrace of the Roman people and the
characteristic valour of the Helvetii. As to his having attacked one
canton by surprise, [at a time] when those who had crossed the river
could not bring assistance to their friends, that he ought not on that
account to ascribe very much to his own valour, or despise them; that
they had so learned from their sires and ancestors, as to rely more on
valour than on artifice or stratagem. Wherefore let him not bring it to
pass that the place, where they were standing, should acquire a name,
from the disaster of the Roman people and the destruction of their army
or transmit the remembrance [of such an event to posterity]."

XIV.--To these words Caesar thus replied:--that "on that very account he
felt less hesitation, because he kept in remembrance those circumstances
which the Helvetian ambassadors had mentioned, and that he felt the more
indignant at them, in proportion as they had happened undeservedly to
the Roman people: for if they had been conscious of having done any
wrong it would not have been difficult to be on their guard, but for
that very reason had they been deceived, because neither were they aware
that any offence had been given by them, on account of which they should
be afraid, nor did they think that they ought to be afraid without
cause. But even if he were willing to forget their former outrage, could
he also lay aside the remembrance of the late wrongs, in that they had
against his will attempted a route through the Province by force, in
that they had molested the Aedui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges? That
as to their so insolently boasting of their victory, and as to their
being astonished that they had so long committed their outrages with
impunity, [both these things] tended to the same point; for the immortal
gods are wont to allow those persons whom they wish to punish for their
guilt sometimes a greater prosperity and longer impunity, in order that
they may suffer the more severely from a reverse of circumstances.
Although these things are so, yet, if hostages were to be given him by
them in order that he may be assured they will do what they promise, and
provided they will give satisfaction to the Aedui for the outrages which
they had committed against them and their allies, and likewise to the
Allobroges, he [Caesar] will make peace with them." Divico replied, that
"the Helvetii had been so trained by their ancestors that they were
accustomed to receive, not to give, hostages; of that fact the Roman
people were witness." Having given this reply, he withdrew.

XV.--On the following day they move their camp from that place; Caesar
does the same, and sends forward all his cavalry, to the number of four
thousand (which he had drawn together from all parts of the Province and
from the Aedui and their allies), to observe towards what parts the
enemy are directing their march. These, having too eagerly pursued the
enemy's rear, come to a battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii in a
disadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elated
with this battle because they had with five hundred horse repulsed so
large a body of horse, began to face us more boldly, sometimes too from
their rear to provoke our men by an attack. Caesar [however] restrained
his men from battle, deeming it sufficient for the present to prevent
the enemy from rapine, forage, and depredation. They marched for about
fifteen days in such a manner that there was not more than five or six
miles between the enemy's rear and our van.

XVI.--Meanwhile, Caesar kept daily importuning the Aedui for the corn
which they had promised in the name of their state; for, in consequence
of the coldness (Gaul being, as before said, situated towards the
north), not only was the corn in the fields not ripe, but there was not
in store a sufficiently large quantity even of fodder: besides he was
unable to use the corn which he had conveyed in ships up the river
Saone, because the Helvetii, from whom he was unwilling to retire, had
diverted their march from the Saone. The Aedui kept deferring from day
to day, and saying that it was being "collected--brought in--on the
road." When he saw that he was put off too long, and that the day was
close at hand on which he ought to serve out the corn to his soldiers,--
having called together their chiefs, of whom he had a great number in
his camp, among them Divitiacus, and Liscus who was invested with the
chief magistracy (whom the Aedui style the Vergobretus, and who is
elected annually, and has power of life and death over his countrymen),
he severely reprimands them, because he is not assisted by them on so
urgent an occasion, when the enemy were so close at hand, and when
[corn] could neither be bought nor taken from the fields, particularly
as, in a great measure urged by their prayers, he had undertaken the
war; much more bitterly, therefore, does he complain of his being
forsaken.

XVII.--Then at length Liscus, moved by Caesar's speech, discloses what
he had hitherto kept secret:--that "there are some whose influence with
the people is very great, who, though private men, have more power than
the magistrates themselves: that these by seditious and violent language
are deterring the populace from contributing the corn which they ought
to supply; [by telling them] that, if they cannot any longer retain the
supremacy of Gaul, it were better to submit to the government of Gauls
than of Romans, nor ought they to doubt that, if the Romans should
overpower the Helvetii, they would wrest their freedom from the Aedui
together with the remainder of Gaul. By these very men [said he] are our
plans, and whatever is done in the camp, disclosed to the enemy; that
they could not be restrained by _him_: nay more, he was well aware that,
though compelled by necessity, he had disclosed the matter to Caesar, at
how great a risk he had done it; and for that reason, he had been silent
as long as he could."

XVIII.--Caesar perceived that, by this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, the
brother of Divitiacus, was indicated; but, as he was unwilling that
these matters should be discussed while so many were present, he
speedily dismisses the council, but detains Liscus: he inquires from him
when alone, about those things which he had said in the meeting. He
[Liscus] speaks more unreservedly and boldly. He [Caesar] makes
inquiries on the same points privately of others, and discovers that it
is all true; that "Dumnorix is the person, a man of the highest daring,
in great favour with the people on account of his liberality, a man
eager for a revolution: that for a great many years he has been in the
habit of contracting for the customs and all the other taxes of the
Aedui at a small cost, because when _he_ bids, no one dares to bid
against him. By these means he has both increased his own private
property and amassed great means for giving largesses; that he maintains
constantly at his own expense and keeps about his own person a great
number of cavalry, and that not only at home, but even among the
neighbouring states, he has great influence, and for the sake of
strengthening this influence has given his mother in marriage among the
Bituriges to a man the most noble and most influential there; that he
has himself taken a wife from among the Helvetii, and has given his
sister by the mother's side and his female relations in marriage into
other states; that he favours and wishes well to the Helvetii on account
of this connection; and that he hates Caesar and the Romans, on his own
account, because by their arrival his power was weakened, and his
brother, Divitiacus, restored to his former position of influence and
dignity: that, if anything should happen to the Romans, he entertains
the highest hope of gaining the sovereignty by means of the Helvetii,
but that under the government of the Roman people he despairs not only
of royalty but even of that influence which he already has." Caesar
discovered too, on inquiring into the unsuccessful cavalry engagement
which had taken place a few days before, that the commencement of that
flight had been made by Dumnorix and his cavalry (for Dumnorix was in
command of the cavalry which the Aedui had sent for aid to Caesar); that
by their flight the rest of the cavalry was dismayed.

XIX.--After learning these circumstances, since to these suspicions the
most unequivocal facts were added, viz., that he had led the Helvetii
through the territories of the Sequani; that he had provided that
hostages should be mutually given; that he had done all these things,
not only without any orders of his [Caesar's] and of his own state's,
but even without their [the Aedui] knowing anything of it themselves;
that he [Dumnorix] was reprimanded by the [chief] magistrate of the
Aedui; he [Caesar] considered that there was sufficient reason why he
should either punish him himself, or order the state to do so. One thing
[however] stood in the way of all this--that he had learned by
experience his brother Divitiacus's very high regard for the Roman
people, his great affection towards him, his distinguished faithfulness,
justice, and moderation; for he was afraid lest by the punishment of
this man, he should hurt the feelings of Divitiacus. Therefore, before
he attempted anything, he orders Divitiacus to be summoned to him, and
when the ordinary interpreters had been withdrawn, converses with him
through Caius Valerius Procillus, chief of the province of Gaul, an
intimate friend of his, in whom he reposed the highest confidence in
everything; at the same time he reminds him of what was said about
Dumnorix in the council of the Gauls, when he himself was present, and
shows what each had said of him privately in his [Caesar's] own
presence; he begs and exhorts him, that, without offence to his
feelings, he may either himself pass judgment on him [Dumnorix] after
trying the case, or else order the [Aeduan] state to do so.

XX.-Divitiacus, embracing Caesar, begins to implore him, with many
tears, that "he would not pass any very severe sentence upon his
brother; saying, that he knows that those [charges] are true, and that
nobody suffered more pain on that account than he himself did; for when
he himself could effect a very great deal by his influence at home and
in the rest of Gaul, and he [Dumnorix] very little on account of his
youth, the latter had become powerful through his means, which power and
strength he used not only to the lessening of his [Divitiacus]
popularity, but almost to his ruin; that he, however, was influenced
both by fraternal affection and by public opinion. But if anything very
severe from Caesar should befall him [Dumnorix], no one would think that
it had been done without his consent, since he himself held such a place
in Caesar's friendship; from which circumstance it would arise that the
affections of the whole of Gaul would be estranged from him." As he was
with tears begging these things of Caesar in many words, Caesar takes
his right hand, and, comforting him, begs him to make an end of
entreating, and assures him that his regard for him is so great that he
forgives both the injuries of the republic and his private wrongs, at
his desire and prayers. He summons Dumnorix to him; he brings in his
brother; he points out what he censures in him; he lays before him what
he of himself perceives, and what the state complains of; he warns him
for the future to avoid all grounds of suspicion; he says that he
pardons the past, for the sake of his brother, Divitiacus. He sets spies
over Dumnorix that he may be able to know what he does, and with whom he
communicates.

XXI.--Being on the same day informed by his scouts that the enemy had
encamped at the foot of a mountain eight miles from his own camp, he
sent persons to ascertain what the nature of the mountain was, and of
what kind the ascent on every side. Word was brought back that it was
easy. During the third watch he orders Titus Labienus, his lieutenant
with praetorian powers, to ascend to the highest ridge of the mountain
with two legions, and with those as guides who had examined the road; he
explains what his plan is. He himself during the fourth watch, hastens
to them by the same route by which the enemy had gone, and sends on all
the cavalry before him. Publius Considius, who was reputed to be very
experienced in military affairs, and had been in the army of Lucius
Sulla, and afterwards in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with
the scouts.

XXII.--At day-break, when the summit of the mountain was in the
possession of Titus Labienus, and he himself was not further off than a
mile and half from the enemy's camp, nor, as he afterwards ascertained
from the captives, had either his arrival or that of Labienus been
discovered; Considius, with his horse at full gallop, comes up to him--
says that the mountain which he [Caesar] wished should be seized by
Labienus, is in possession of the enemy; that he has discovered this by
the Gallic arms and ensigns. Caesar leads off his forces to the next
hill: [and] draws them up in battle-order. Labienus, as he had been
ordered by Caesar not to come to an engagement unless [Caesar's] own
forces were seen near the enemy's camp, that the attack upon the enemy
might be made on every side at the same time, was, after having taken
possession of the mountain, waiting for our men, and refraining from
battle. When, at length, the day was far advanced, Caesar learned
through spies that the mountain was in possession of his own men, and
that the Helvetii had moved their camp, and that Considius, struck with
fear, had reported to him, as seen, that which he had not seen. On that
day he follows the enemy at his usual distance, and pitches his camp
three miles from theirs.

XXIII.--The next day (as there remained in all only two days' space [to
the time] when he must serve out the corn to his army, and as he was not
more than eighteen miles from Bibracte, by far the largest and best-stored
town of the Aedui) he thought that he ought to provide for a
supply of corn; and diverted his march from the Helvetii, and advanced
rapidly to Bibracte. This circumstance is reported to the enemy by some
deserters from Lucius Aemilius, a captain of the Gallic horse. The
Helvetii, either because they thought that the Romans, struck with
terror, were retreating from them, the more so, as the day before,
though they had seized on the higher grounds, they had not joined
battle; or because they flattered themselves that they might be cut off
from the provisions, altering their plan and changing their route, began
to pursue and to annoy our men in the rear.

XXIV.--Caesar, when he observes this, draws off his forces to the next
hill, and sent the cavalry to sustain the attack of the enemy. He
himself, meanwhile, drew up on the middle of the hill a triple line of
his four veteran legions in such a manner that he placed above him on
the very summit the two legions which he had lately levied in Hither
Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered that the whole mountain
should be covered with men, and that meanwhile the baggage should be
brought together into one place, and the position be protected by those
who were posted in the upper line. The Helvetii, having followed with
all their waggons, collected their baggage into one place: they
themselves, after having repulsed our cavalry and formed a phalanx,
advanced up to our front line in very close order.

XXV.--Caesar, having removed out of sight first his own horse, then
those of all, that he might make the danger of all equal, and do away
with the hope of flight, after encouraging his men, joined battle. His
soldiers, hurling their javelins from the higher ground, easily broke
the enemy's phalanx. That being dispersed, they made a charge on them
with drawn swords. It was a great hindrance to the Gauls in fighting,
that, when several of their bucklers had been by one stroke of the
(Roman) javelins pierced through and pinned fast together, as the point
of the iron had bent itself, they could neither pluck it out, nor, with
their left hand entangled, fight with sufficient ease; so that many,
after having long tossed their arm about, chose rather to cast away the
buckler from their hand, and to fight with their person unprotected. At
length, worn out with wounds, they began to give way, and as there was
in the neighbourhood a mountain about a mile off, to betake themselves
thither. When the mountain had been gained, and our men were advancing
up, the Boii and Tulingi, who with about 15,000 men closed the enemy's
line of march and served as a guard to their rear, having assailed our
men on the exposed flank as they advanced [prepared] to surround them;
upon seeing which, the Helvetii, who had betaken themselves to the
mountain, began to press on again and renew the battle. The Romans
having faced about, advanced to the attack in two divisions; the first
and second line to withstand those who had been defeated and driven off
the field; the third to receive those who were just arriving.

XXVI.--Thus was the contest long and vigorously carried on with doubtful
success. When they could no longer withstand the attacks of our men, the
one division, as they had begun to do, betook themselves to the
mountain; the other repaired to their baggage and waggons. For during
the whole of this battle, although the fight lasted from the seventh
hour [_i.e._ 12 (noon)--1 P.M.] to eventide, no one could see an enemy
with his back turned. The fight was carried on also at the baggage till
late in the night, for they had set waggons in the way as a rampart, and
from the higher ground kept throwing weapons upon our men, as they came
on, and some from between the waggons and the wheels kept darting their
lances and javelins from beneath, and wounding our men. After the fight
had lasted some time, our men gained possession of their baggage and
camp. There the daughter and one of the sons of Orgetorix were taken.
After that battle about 130,000 men [of the enemy] remained alive, who
marched incessantly during the whole of that night; and after a march
discontinued for no part of the night, arrived in the territories of the
Lingones on the fourth day, whilst our men, having stopped for three
days, both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and the burial of
the slain, had not been able to follow them. Caesar sent letters and
messengers to the Lingones [with orders] that they should not assist
them with corn or with anything else; for that if they should assist
them, he would regard them in the same light as the Helvetii. After the
three days' interval he began to follow them himself with all his
forces.

XXVII.--The Helvetii, compelled by the want of everything, sent
ambassadors to him about a surrender. When these had met him in the way
and had thrown themselves at his feet, and speaking in suppliant tone
had with tears sued for peace, and [when] he had ordered them to await
his arrival, in the place where they then were, they obeyed his
commands. When Caesar arrived at that place, he demanded hostages, their
arms, and the slaves who had deserted to them. Whilst those things are
being sought for and got together, after a night's interval, about 6000
men of that canton which is called the Verbigene, whether terrified by
fear, lest, after delivering up their arms, they should suffer
punishment, or else induced by the hope of safety, because they supposed
that, amid so vast a multitude of those who had surrendered themselves,
_their_ flight might either be concealed or entirely overlooked, having
at night-fall departed out of the camp of the Helvetii, hastened to the
Rhine and the territories of the Germans.

XXVIII.--But when Caesar discovered this, he commanded those through
whose territories they had gone, to seek them, out and to bring them
back again, if they meant to be acquitted before him; and considered
them, when brought back, in the light of enemies; he admitted all the
rest to a surrender, upon their delivering up the hostages, arms, and
deserters. He ordered the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi to
return to their territories from which they had come, and as there was
at home nothing whereby they might support their hunger, all the
productions of the earth having been destroyed, he commanded the
Allobroges to let them have a plentiful supply of corn; and ordered them
to rebuild the towns and villages which they had burnt. This he did,
chiefly on this account, because he was unwilling that the country, from
which the Helvetii had departed, should be untenanted, lest the Germans,
who dwell on the other side of the Rhine, should, on account of the
excellence of the lands, cross over from their own territories into
those of the Helvetii, and become borderers upon the province of Gaul
and the Allobroges. He granted the petition of the Aedui, that they
might settle the Boii, in their own (_i.e._ in the Aeduan) territories,
as these were known to be of distinguished valour to whom they gave
lands, and whom they afterwards admitted to the same state of rights and
freedom as themselves.

XXIX.--In the camp of the Helvetii, lists were found, drawn up in Greek
characters, and were brought to Caesar, in which an estimate had been
drawn up, name by name, of the number which had gone forth from their
country of those who were able to bear arms; and likewise the boys, the
old men, and the women, separately. Of all which items the total was:-

Of the _Helvetii_ [lit. of the heads of the Helvetii] 263,000
Of the _Tulingi_                                       36,000
Of the _Latobrigi_                                     14,000
Of the _Rauraci_                                       23,000
Of the _Boii_                                          32,000
                                                      -------
The sum of all amounted to                            368,000

Out of these, such as could bear arms [amounted] to about 92,000. When
the _census_ of those who returned home was taken, as Caesar had
commanded, the number was found to be 110,000.

XXX.--When the war with the Helvetii was concluded, ambassadors from
almost all parts of Gaul, the chiefs of states, assembled to
congratulate Caesar, [saying] that they were well aware, that, although
he had taken vengeance on the Helvetii in war, for the old wrongs done
by them to the Roman people, yet that circumstance had happened no less
to the benefit of the land of Gaul than of the Roman people, because the
Helvetii, while their affairs were most flourishing, had quitted their
country with the design of making war upon the whole of Gaul, and
seizing the government of it, and selecting, out of a great abundance,
that spot for an abode which they should judge to be the most convenient
and most productive of all Gaul, and hold the rest of the states as
tributaries. They requested that they might be allowed to proclaim an
assembly of the whole of Gaul for a particular day, and to do that with
Caesar's permission, [stating] that they had some things which, with the
general consent, they wished to ask of him. This request having been
granted, they appointed a day for the assembly, and ordained by an oath
with each other, that no one should disclose [their deliberations]
except those to whom this [office] should be assigned by the general
assembly.

XXXI.--When that assembly was dismissed, the same chiefs of states, who
had before been to Caesar, returned, and asked that they might be
allowed to treat with him privately (in secret) concerning the safety of
themselves and of all. That request having been obtained, they all threw
themselves in tears at Caesar's feet, [saying] that they no less begged
and earnestly desired that what they might say should not be disclosed
than that they might obtain those things which they wished for; inasmuch
as they saw that, if a disclosure were made, they should be put to the
greatest tortures. For these Divitiacus the Aeduan spoke and told him:--
"That there were two parties in the whole of Gaul: that the Aedui stood
at the head of one of these, the Arverni of the other. After these had
been violently struggling with one another for the superiority for many
years, it came to pass that the Germans were called in for hire by the
Arverni and the Sequani. That about 15,000 of them [_i.e._ of the
Germans] had at first crossed the Rhine: but after that these wild and
savage men had become enamoured of the lands and the refinement and the
abundance of the Gauls, more were brought over, that there were now as
many as 120,000 of them in Gaul: that with these the Aedui and their
dependants had repeatedly struggled in arms, that they had been routed
and had sustained a great calamity--had lost all their nobility, all
their senate, all their cavalry. And that broken by such engagements and
calamities, although they had formerly been very powerful in Gaul, both
from their own valour and from the Roman people's hospitality and
friendship, they were now compelled to give the chief nobles of their
state as hostages to the Sequani, and to bind their state by an oath,
that they would neither demand hostages in return, nor supplicate aid
from the Roman people, nor refuse to be for ever under their sway and
empire. That he was the only one out of all the state of the Aedui who
could not be prevailed upon to take the oath or to give his children as
hostages. On that account he had fled from his state and had gone to the
senate at Rome to beseech aid, as he alone was bound neither by oath nor
hostages. But a worse thing had befallen the victorious Sequani than the
vanquished Aedui, for Ariovistus, the king of the Germans, had settled
in their territories, and had seized upon a third of their land, which
was the best in the whole of Gaul, and was now ordering them to depart
from another third part, because a few months previously 24,000 men of
the Harudes had come to him, for whom room and settlements must be
provided. The consequence would be, that in a few years they would all
be driven from the territories of Gaul, and all the Germans would cross
the Rhine; for neither must the land of Gaul be compared with the land
of the Germans, nor must the habit of living of the latter be put on a
level with that of the former. Moreover, [as for] Ariovistus, no sooner
did he defeat the forces of the Gauls in a battle, which took place at
Magetobria, than [he began] to lord it haughtily and cruelly, to demand
as hostages the children of all the principal nobles, and wreak on them
every kind of cruelty, if everything was not done at his nod or
pleasure; that he was a savage, passionate, and reckless man, and that
his commands could no longer be borne. Unless there was some aid in
Caesar and the Roman people, the Gauls must all do the same thing that
the Helvetii had done, [viz.] emigrate from their country, and seek
another dwelling place, other settlements remote from the Germans, and
try whatever fortune may fall to their lot. If these things were to be
disclosed to Ariovistus, [Divitiacus adds] that he doubts not that he
would inflict the most severe punishment on all the hostages who are in
his possession, [and says] that Caesar could, either by his own
influence and by that of his army, or by his late victory, or by name of
the Roman people, intimidate him, so as to prevent a greater number of
Germans being brought over the Rhine, and could protect all Gaul from
the outrages of Ariovistus."

XXXII.--When this speech had been delivered by Divitiacus, all who were
present began with loud lamentation to entreat assistance of Caesar.
Caesar noticed that the Sequani were the only people of all who did none
of those things which the others did, but, with their heads bowed down,
gazed on the earth in sadness. Wondering what was the reason of this
conduct, he inquired of themselves. No reply did the Sequani make, but
silently continued in the same sadness. When he had repeatedly
inquired of them and could not elicit any answer at all, the same
Divitiacus the Aeduan answered, that--"the lot of the Sequani was more
wretched and grievous than that of the rest, on this account, because
they alone durst not even in secret complain or supplicate aid; and
shuddered at the cruelty of Ariovistus [even when] absent, just as if he
were present; for, to the rest, despite of everything, there was an
opportunity of flight given; but all tortures must be endured by the
Sequani, who had admitted Ariovistus within their territories, and whose
towns were all in his power."

XXXIII.--Caesar, on being informed of these things, cheered the minds of
the Gauls with his words, and promised that this affair should be an
object of his concern, [saying] that he had great hopes that Ariovistus,
induced both by his kindness and his power, would put an end to his
oppression. After delivering this speech, he dismissed the assembly;
and, besides those statements, many circumstances induced him to think
that this affair ought to be considered and taken up by him; especially
as he saw that the Aedui, styled [as they had been] repeatedly by the
senate "brethren" and "kinsmen," were held in the thraldom and dominion
of the Germans, and understood that their hostages were with Ariovistus
and the Sequani, which in so mighty an empire [as that] of the Roman
people he considered very disgraceful to himself and the republic. That,
moreover, the Germans should by degrees become accustomed to cross the
Rhine, and that a great body of them should come into Gaul, he saw
[would be] dangerous to the Roman people, and judged that wild and
savage men would not be likely to restrain themselves, after they had
possessed themselves of all Gaul, from going forth into the province and
thence marching into Italy (as the Cimbri and Teutones had done before
them), particularly as the Rhone [was the sole barrier that] separated
the Sequani from our province. Against which events he thought he ought
to provide as speedily as possible. Moreover, Ariovistus, for his part,
had assumed to himself such pride and arrogance that he was felt to be
quite insufferable.

XXXIV.--He therefore determined to send ambassadors to Ariovistus to
demand of him to name some intermediate spot for a conference between
the two, [saying] that he wished to treat with him on state-business and
matters of the highest importance to both of them. To this embassy
Ariovistus replied, that if he himself had had need of anything from
Caesar, he would have gone to him; and that if Caesar wanted anything
from him he ought to come to him. That, besides, neither dare he go
without an army into those parts of Gaul which Caesar had possession of,
nor could he, without great expense and trouble, draw his army together
to one place; that to him, moreover, it appeared strange what business
either Caesar or the Roman people at all had in his own Gaul, which he
had conquered in war.

XXXV.--When these answers were reported to Caesar, he sends ambassadors
to him a second time with this message "Since, after having been treated
with so much kindness by himself and the Roman people (as he had in his
consulship [B.C. 59] been styled 'king and friend' by the senate), he
makes this recompense to [Caesar] himself and the Roman people, [viz.]
that when invited to a conference he demurs, and does not think that it
concerns him to advise and inform himself about an object of mutual
interest, these are the things which he requires of him; first, that he
do not any more bring over any body of men across the Rhine into Gaul;
in the next place, that he restore the hostages which he has from the
Aedui, and grant the Sequani permission to restore to them with his
consent those hostages which they have, and that he neither provoke the
Aedui by outrage nor make war upon them or their allies; if he would
accordingly do this," [Caesar says] that "he himself and the Roman
people will entertain a perpetual feeling of favour and friendship
towards him; but that if he [Caesar] does not obtain [his desires], that
he (forasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso
[B.C. 61] the senate had decreed that, whoever should have the
administration of the province of Gaul should, as far as he could do so
consistently with the interests of the republic, protect the Aedui and
the other friends of the Roman people) will not overlook the wrongs of
the Aedui."

XXXVI.--To this Ariovistus replied, that "the right of war was, that
they who had conquered should govern those whom they had conquered, in
what manner they pleased; that in that way the Roman people were wont to
govern the nations which they had conquered, not according to the
dictation of any other, but according to their own discretion. If he for
his part did not dictate to the Roman people as to the manner in which
they were to exercise their right, he ought not to be obstructed by the
Roman people in his right; that the Aedui, inasmuch as they had tried
the fortune of war and had engaged in arms and been conquered, had
become tributaries to him; that Caesar was doing a great injustice, in
that by his arrival he was making his revenues less valuable to him;
that he should not restore their hostages to the Aedui, but should not
make war wrongfully either upon them or their allies, if they abided by
that which had been agreed on, and paid their tribute annually: if they
did _not_ continue to do that, the Roman people's name of 'brothers'
would avail them nought. As to Caesar's threatening him that be would
not overlook the wrongs of the Aedui, [he said] that no one had ever
entered into a contest with _him_ [Ariovistus] without utter ruin to
himself. That Caesar might enter the lists when he chose; he would feel
what the invincible Germans, well-trained [as they were] beyond all
others to arms, who for fourteen years had not been beneath a roof,
could achieve by their valour."

XXXVII.--At the same time that this message was delivered to Caesar,
ambassadors came from the Aedui and the Treviri; from the Aedui to
complain that the Harudes, who had lately been brought over into Gaul,
were ravaging their territories; that they had not been able to purchase
peace from Ariovistus, even by giving hostages: and from the Treviri,
[to state] that a hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped on the banks
of the Rhine, and were attempting to cross it; that the brothers, Nasuas
and Cimberius, headed them. Being greatly alarmed at these things,
Caesar thought that he ought to use all despatch, lest, if thus new band
of Suevi should unite with the old troops of Ariovistus, he [Ariovistus]
might be less easily withstood. Having, therefore, as quickly as he
could, provided a supply of corn, he hastened to Ariovistus by forced
marches.

XXXVIII.--When he had proceeded three days' journey, word was brought to
him that Ariovistus was hastening with all his forces to seize on
Vesontio, which is the largest town of the Sequani, and had advanced
three days' journey from his territories. Caesar thought that he ought
to take the greatest precautions lest this should happen, for there was
in that town a most ample supply of everything which was serviceable for
war; and so fortified was it by the nature of the ground as to afford a
great facility for protracting the war, inasmuch as the river Doubs
almost surrounds the whole town, as though it were traced round it with
a pair of compasses. A mountain of great height shuts in the remaining
space, which is not more than 600 feet, where the river leaves a gap, in
such a manner that the roots of that mountain extend to the river's bank
on either side. A wall thrown around it makes a citadel of this
[mountain], and connects it with the town. Hither Caesar hastens by
forced marches by night and day, and, after having seized the town,
stations a garrison there.

XXXIX.--Whilst he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn
and provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the reports of the
Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Germans were men of huge
stature, of incredible valour and practice in arms, that ofttimes they,
on encountering them, could not bear even their countenance, and the
fierceness of their eyes)--so great a panic on a sudden seized the whole
army, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree.
This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the
rest, who, having followed Caesar from the city [Rome] from motives of
friendship, had no great experience in military affairs. And alleging,
some of them one reason, some another, which they said made it necessary
for them to depart, they requested that by his consent they might be
allowed to withdraw; some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in order
that they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither
compose their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears: but
hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored with
their comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed universally
throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice of these
men, even those who possessed great experience in the camp, both
soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions] who were in command
of the cavalry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as wished to
be considered less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, but
feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the forests which
lay between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not be
brought up readily enough. Some even declared to Caesar that when he
gave orders for the camp to be moved and the troops to advance, the
soldiers would not be obedient to the command, nor advance in
consequence of their fear.

XL.--When Caesar observed these things, having called a council, and
summoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he severely
reprimanded them, "particularly for supposing that it belonged to them
to inquire or conjecture, either in what direction they were marching,
or with what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar's] consulship,
had most anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why
should any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? He
for his part was persuaded that, when his demands were known and the
fairness of the terms considered, he would reject neither his nor the
Roman people's favour. But even if, driven on by rage and madness, he
should make war upon them, what after all were they afraid of?--or why
should they despair either of their own valour or of his zeal? Of that
enemy a trial had been made within our fathers' recollection, when, on
the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army was
regarded as having deserved no less praise than their commander himself.
It had been made lately, too, in Italy; during the rebellion of the
slaves, whom, however, the experience and training which they had
received from us, assisted in some respect. From which a judgment might
be formed of the advantages which resolution carries with it,--inasmuch
as those whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded when unarmed,
they had afterwards vanquished, when well armed and flushed with
success. In short, that these were the same men whom the Helvetii, in
frequent encounters, not only in their own territories, but also in
theirs [the German], have generally vanquished, and yet cannot have been
a match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls
disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when
the Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war,
Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in the
marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly
upon them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in all
directions, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than
valour. But though there had been room for such stratagem against savage
and unskilled men, not even [Ariovistus] himself expected that thereby
our armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear to a
pretence about the [deficiency of] supplies and the narrowness of the
roads, acted presumptuously, as they seemed either to distrust their
general's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That these things
were his concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were to
furnish the corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as to
the road they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its
being reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, or
advance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew that in the
case of all those whose army had not been obedient to command, either
upon some mismanagement of an affair, fortune had deserted them, or,
that upon some crime being discovered, covetousness had been clearly
proved [against them]. His integrity had been seen throughout his whole
life, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would
therefore instantly set about what he had intended to put off till a
more distant day, and would break up his camp the next night, in the
fourth watch, that he might ascertain, as soon as possible, whether a
sense of honour and duty, or whether fear had more influence with them.
But that, if no one else should follow, yet he would go with only the
tenth legion, of which he had no misgivings, and it should be his
praetorian cohort."--This legion Caesar had both greatly favoured, and
in it, on account of its valour, placed the greatest confidence.

XLI.-Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed in
a surprising, manner, and the highest ardour and eagerness for
prosecuting the war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the first
to return thanks to him, through their military tribunes, for his having
expressed this most favourable opinion of them; and assured him that
they were quite ready to prosecute the war. Then, the other legions
endeavoured, through their military tribunes and the centurions of the
principal companies, to excuse themselves to Caesar, [saying] that they
had never either doubted or feared, or supposed that the determination
of the conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's. Having
accepted their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitred by
Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith, [he
found] that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might lead
his army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as he
had said [he would]. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his
march, he was informed by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only
four and twenty miles distant from ours.

XLII.--Upon being apprised of Caesar's arrival, Ariovistus sends
ambassadors to him, [saying] that what he had before requested as to a
conference, might now, as far as his permission went, take place, since
he [Caesar] had approached nearer, and he considered that he might now
do it without danger. Caesar did not reject the proposal and began to
think that he was now returning to a rational state of mind, as he
spontaneously proffered that which he had previously refused to him when
requesting it; and was in great hopes that, in consideration of his own
and the Roman people's great favours towards him, the issue would be
that he would desist from his obstinacy upon his demands being made
known. The fifth day after that was appointed as the day of conference.
Meanwhile, as ambassadors were being often sent to and fro between them,
Ariovistus demanded that Caesar should not bring any foot-soldier with
him to the conference, [saying] that "he was afraid of being ensnared by
him through treachery; that both should come accompanied by cavalry;
that he would not come on any other condition." Caesar, as he neither
wished that the conference should, by an excuse thrown in the way, be
set aside, nor durst trust his life to the cavalry of the Gauls, decided
that it would be most expedient to take away from the Gallic cavalry all
their horses, and thereon to mount the legionary soldiers of the tenth
legion, in which he placed the greatest confidence; in order that he
might have a body-guard as trustworthy as possible, should there be any
need for action. And when this was done, one of the soldiers of the
tenth legion said, not without a touch of humour, "that Caesar did more
for them than he had promised; he had promised to have the tenth legion
in place of his praetorian cohort; but he now converted them into
horse."

XLIII.--There was a large plain, and in it a mound of earth of
considerable size. This spot was at nearly an equal distance from both
camps. Thither, as had been appointed, they came for the conference.
Caesar stationed the legion, which he had brought [with him] on
horseback, 200 paces from this mound. The cavalry of Ariovistus also
took their stand at an equal distance. Ariovistus then demanded that
they should confer on horseback, and that, besides themselves, they
should bring with them ten men each to the conference. When they were
come to the place, Caesar, in the opening of his speech, detailed his
own and the senate's favours towards him [Ariovistus], "in that he had
been styled king, in that [he had been styled] friend, by the senate--
in that very considerable presents had been sent him; which circumstance
he informed him had both fallen to the lot of few, and had usually been
bestowed in consideration of important personal services; that he,
although he had neither an introduction, nor a just ground for the
request, had obtained these honours through the kindness and munificence
of himself [Caesar] and the senate. He informed him too, how old and how
just were the grounds of connexion that existed between themselves [the
Romans] and the Aedui, what decrees of the senate had been passed in
their favour, and how frequent and how honourable; how from time
immemorial the Aedui had held the supremacy of the whole of Gaul; even
[said Caesar] before they had sought our friendship; that it was the
custom of the Roman people to desire not only that its allies and
friends should lose none of their property, but be advanced in
influence, dignity, and honour: who then could endure that what they had
brought with them to the friendship of the Roman people, should be torn
from them?" He then made the same demands which he had commissioned the
ambassadors to make, that [Ariovistus] should not make war either upon
the Aedui or their allies, that he should restore the hostages; that, if
he could not send back to their country any part of the Germans, he
should at all events suffer none of them any more to cross the Rhine.

XLIV.--Ariovistus replied briefly to the demands of Caesar; but
expatiated largely on his own virtues, "that he had crossed the Rhine
not of his own accord, but on being invited and sent for by the Gauls;
that he had not left home and kindred without great expectations and
great rewards; that he had settlements in Gaul, granted by the Gauls
themselves; that the hostages had been given by their own good-will;
that he took by right of war the tribute which conquerors are accustomed
to impose on the conquered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but
the Gauls upon him; that all the states of Gaul came to attack him, and
had encamped against him; that all their forces had been routed and
beaten by him in a single battle; that if they chose to make a second
trial, he was ready to encounter them again; but if they chose to enjoy
peace, it was unfair to refuse the tribute, which of their own free-will
they had paid up to that time. That the friendship of the Roman people
ought to prove to him an ornament and a safeguard, not a detriment; and
that he sought it with that expectation. But if through the Roman people
the tribute was to be discontinued, and those who surrendered to be
seduced from him, he would renounce the friendship of the Roman people
no less heartily than he had sought it. As to his leading over a host of
Germans into Gaul, that he was doing this with a view of securing
himself, not of assaulting Gaul: that there was evidence of this, in
that he did not come without being invited, and in that he did not make
war, but merely warded it off. That he had come into Gaul before the
Roman people. That never before this time did a Roman army go beyond the
frontiers of the province of Gaul. What [said he] does [Caesar] desire?
--why come into his [Ariovistus's] domains?--that this was his province
of Gaul, just as that is ours. As it ought not to be pardoned in him, if
he were to make an attack upon our territories; so, likewise, that we
were unjust to obstruct him in his prerogative. As for Caesar's saying
that the Aedui had been styled 'brethren' by the senate, he was not so
uncivilized nor so ignorant of affairs, as not to know that the Aedui in
the very last war with the Allobroges had neither rendered assistance to
the Romans, nor received any from the Roman people in the struggles
which the Aedui had been maintaining with him and with the Sequani. He
must feel suspicious that Caesar, though feigning friendship as the
reason for his keeping an army in Gaul; was keeping it with the view of
crushing him. And that unless he depart, and withdraw his army from
these parts, he shall regard him not as a friend, but as a foe; and
that, even if he should put him to death, he should do what would please
many of the nobles and leading men of the Roman people; he had assurance
of that from themselves through their messengers, and could purchase the
favour and the friendship of them all by his [Caesar's] death. But if he
would depart and resign to him the free possession of Gaul, he would
recompense him with a great reward, and would bring to a close whatever
wars he wished to be carried on, without any trouble or risk to him."

XLV.--Many things were stated by Caesar to the effect [to show]: "why he
could not waive the business, and that neither his nor the Roman
people's practice would suffer him to abandon most meritorious allies,
nor did he deem that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus rather than to the
Roman people; that the Arverni and the Ruteni had been subdued in war by
Quintus Fabius Maximus, and that the Roman people had pardoned them and
had not reduced them into a province or imposed a tribute upon them. And
if the most ancient period was to be regarded--then was the sovereignty
of the Roman people in Gaul most just: if the decree of the senate was
to be observed, then ought Gaul to be free, which they [the Romans] had
conquered in war, and had permitted to enjoy its own laws."

XLVI.--While these things are being transacted in the conference, it was
announced to Caesar that the cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching
nearer the mound, and were riding up to our men, and casting stones and
weapons at them. Caesar made an end of his speech and betook himself to
his men; and commanded them that they should by no means return a weapon
upon the enemy. For though he saw that an engagement with the cavalry
would be without any danger to his chosen legion, yet he did not think
proper to engage, lest, after the enemy were routed, it might be said
that they had been ensnared by him under the sanction of a conference.
When it was spread abroad among the common soldiery with what
haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved at the conference, and how he had
ordered the Romans to quit Gaul, and how his cavalry had made an attack
upon our men, and how this had broken off the conference, a much greater
alacrity and eagerness for battle was infused into our army.

XLVII.--Two days after, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Caesar, to state
"that he wished to treat with him about those things which had been
begun to be treated of between them, but had not been concluded"; [and
to beg] that "he would either again appoint a day for a conference; or,
if he were not willing to do that, that he would send one of his
[officers] as an ambassador to him." There did not appear to Caesar any
good reason for holding a conference; and the more so as the day before
the Germans could not be restrained from casting weapons at our men. He
thought he should not without great danger send to him as ambassador one
of his [Roman] officers, and should expose him to savage men. It seemed
[therefore] most proper to send to him C. Valerius Procillus, the son of
C. Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest courage and
accomplishments (whose father had been presented with the freedom of the
city by C. Valerius Flaccus), both on account of his fidelity and on
account of his knowledge of the Gallic language, which Ariovistus, by
long practice, now spoke fluently; and because in his case the Germans
would have no motive for committing violence; and [as his colleague] M.
Mettius, who had shared the hospitality of Ariovistus. He commissioned
them to learn what Ariovistus had to say, and to report to him. But when
Ariovistus saw them before him in his camp, he cried out in the presence
of his army, "Why were they come to him? was it for the purpose of
acting as spies?" He stopped them when attempting to speak, and cast
them into chains.

XLVIII.--The same day he moved his camp forward and pitched under a hill
six miles from Caesar's camp. The day following he led his forces past
Caesar's camp, and encamped two miles beyond him; with this design--that
he might cut off Caesar from, the corn and provisions which might be
conveyed to him from the Sequani and the Aedui. For five successive days
from that day, Caesar drew out his forces before the camp, and put them
in battle order, that, if Ariovistus should be willing to engage in
battle, an opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus all this
time kept his army in camp: but engaged daily in cavalry skirmishes. The
method of battle in which the Germans had practised themselves was this.
There were 6000 horse, and as many very active and courageous foot, one
of whom each of the horse selected out of the whole army for his own
protection. By these [foot] they were constantly accompanied in their
engagements; to these the horse retired; these on any emergency rushed
forward; if any one, upon receiving a very severe wound, had fallen from
his horse, they stood around him: if it was necessary to advance
farther: than usual, or to retreat more rapidly, so great, from
practice, was their swiftness, that, supported by the manes of the
horses, they could keep pace with their speed.

XLIX.--Perceiving that Ariovistus kept himself in camp, Caesar, that he
might not any longer be cut off from provisions, chose a convenient
position for a camp beyond that place in which the Germans had encamped,
at about 600 paces from them, and having drawn up his army in three
lines, marched to that place. He ordered the first and second lines to
be under arms; the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant
from the enemy about 600 paces, as has been stated. Thither Ariovistus
sent light troops, about 16,000 men in number, with all his cavalry;
which forces were to intimidate our men, and hinder them in their
fortification. Caesar nevertheless, as he had before arranged, ordered
two lines to drive off the enemy: the third to execute the work. The
camp being fortified, he left there two legions and a portion of the
auxiliaries; and led back the other four legions into the larger camp.

L.--The next day, according to his custom, Caesar led out his forces
from both camps, and having advanced a little from the larger one, drew
up his line of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of fighting.
When he found that they did not even then come out [from their
entrenchments], he led back his army into camp about noon. Then at last
Ariovistus sent part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. The battle
was vigorously maintained on both sides till the evening. At sunset,
after many wounds had been inflicted and received, Ariovistus led back
his forces into camp. When Caesar inquired of his prisoners, wherefore
Ariovistus did not come to an engagement, he discovered this to be the
reason--that among the Germans it was the custom for their matrons to
pronounce from lots and divination whether it were expedient that the
battle should be engaged in or not; that they had said, "that it was not
the will of heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged in
battle before the new moon."

LI.--The day following, Caesar left what seemed sufficient as a guard
for both camps; [and then] drew up all the auxiliaries in sight of the
enemy, before the lesser camp, because he was not very powerful in the
number of legionary soldiers, considering the number of the enemy; that
[thereby] he might make use of his auxiliaries for appearance. He
himself, having drawn up his army in three lines, advanced to the camp
of the enemy. Then at last of necessity the Germans drew their forces
out of camp, and disposed them canton by canton, at equal distances, the
Harudes, Marcomanni, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusii, Suevi; and
surrounded their whole army with their chariots and waggons, that no
hope might be left in flight. On these they placed their women, who,
with dishevelled hair and in tears, entreated the soldiers, as they went
forward to battle, not to deliver them into slavery to the Romans.

LII.--Caesar appointed over each legion a lieutenant and a questor, that
every one might have them as witnesses of his valour. He himself began
the battle at the head of the right wing, because he had observed that
part of the enemy to be the least strong. Accordingly our men, upon the
signal being given, vigorously made an attack upon the enemy, and the
enemy so suddenly and rapidly rushed forward, that there was no time for
casting the javelins at them. Throwing aside [therefore] their javelins,
they fought with swords hand to hand. But the Germans, according to
their custom, rapidly forming a phalanx, sustained the attack of our
swords. There were found very many of our soldiers who leaped upon the
phalanx, and with their hands tore away the shields, and wounded the
enemy from above. Although the army of the enemy was routed on the left
wing and put to flight, they [still] pressed heavily on our men from the
right wing, by the great number of their troops. On observing which, P.
Crassus, a young man, who commanded the cavalry--as he was more
disengaged than those who were employed in the fight--sent the third
line as a relief to our men who were in distress.

LIII.--Thereupon the engagement was renewed, and all the enemy turned
their backs, nor did they cease to flee until they arrived at the river
Rhine, about fifty miles from that place. There some few, either relying
on their strength, endeavoured to swim over, or, finding boats, procured
their safety. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who meeting with a small
vessel tied to the bank, escaped in it: our horse pursued and slew all
the rest of them. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevan by nation, whom
he had brought with him from home; the other a Norican, the sister of
king Vocion, whom he had married in Gaul, she having been sent [thither
for that purpose] by her brother. Both perished in that flight. Of their
two daughters, one was slain, the other captured. C. Valerius Procillus,
as he was being dragged by his guards in the flight, bound with a triple
chain, fell into the hands of Caesar himself, as he was pursuing the
enemy with his cavalry. This circumstance indeed afforded Caesar no less
pleasure than the victory itself; because he saw a man of the first rank
in the province of Gaul, his intimate acquaintance and friend, rescued
from the hand of the enemy, and restored to him, and that fortune had
not diminished aught of the joy and exultation [of that day] by his
destruction. He [Procillus] said that in his own presence the lots had
been thrice consulted respecting him, whether he should immediately be
put to death by fire, or be reserved for another time: that by the
favour of the lots he was uninjured. M. Mettius, also, was found and
brought back to him [Caesar].

LIV.--This battle having been reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who
had come to the banks of that river, began to return home, when the
Ubii, who dwelt nearest to the Rhine, pursuing them, while much alarmed,
slew a great number of them. Caesar having concluded two very important
wars in one campaign, conducted his army into winter quarters among the
Sequani, a little earlier than the season of the year required. He
appointed Labienus over the winter quarters, and set out in person for
Hither Gaul to hold the assizes.



BOOK II

I.--While Caesar was in winter quarters in Hither Gaul, as we have shown
above, frequent reports were brought to him, and he was also informed by
letters from Labienus, that all the Belgae, who we have said are a third
part of Gaul, were entering into a confederacy against the Roman people,
and giving hostages to one another; that the reasons of the confederacy
were these--first, because they feared that, after all [Celtic] Gaul was
subdued, our army would be led against them; secondly, because they were
instigated by several of the Gauls; some of whom as [on the one hand]
they had been unwilling that the Germans should remain any longer in
Gaul, so [on the other] they were dissatisfied that the army of the
Roman people should pass the winter in it, and settle there; and others
of them, from a natural instability and fickleness of disposition, were
anxious for a revolution; [the Belgae were instigated] by several, also,
because the government in Gaul was generally seized upon by the more
powerful persons and by those who had the means of hiring troops, and
they could less easily effect this object under our dominion.

II.--Alarmed by these tidings and letters, Caesar levied two new legions
in Hither Gaul, and, at the beginning of summer, sent Q. Pedius, his
lieutenant, to conduct them further into Gaul. He himself, as soon as
there began to be plenty of forage, came to the army. He gives a
commission to the Senones and the other Gauls who were neighbours of the
Belgae, to learn what is going on amongst them [_i.e._ the Belgae], and
inform him of these matters. These all uniformly reported that troops
were being raised, and that an army was being collected in one place.
Then, indeed, he thought that he ought not to hesitate about proceeding
towards them, and having provided supplies, moves his camp, and in about
fifteen days arrives at the territories of the Belgae.

III.--As he arrived there unexpectedly and sooner than any one
anticipated, the Remi, who are the nearest of the Belgae to [Celtic]
Gaul, sent to him Iccius and Antebrogius, [two of] the principal persons
of the state, as their ambassadors: to tell hum that they surrendered
themselves and all their possessions to the protection and disposal of
the Roman people: and that they had neither combined with the rest of
the Belgae, nor entered into any confederacy against the Roman people:
and were prepared to give hostages, to obey his commands, to receive him
into their towns, and to aid him with corn and other things; that all
the rest of the Belgae were in arms; and that the Germans, who dwell on
this side the Rhine, had joined themselves to them; and that so great
was the infatuation of them all that they could not restrain even the
Suessiones, their own brethren and kinsmen, who enjoy the same rights,
and the same laws, and who have one government and one magistracy [in
common] with themselves, from uniting with them.

IV.--When Caesar inquired of them what states were in arms, how powerful
they were, and what they could do in war, he received the following
information: that the greater part of the Belgae were sprung from the
Germans, and that having crossed the Rhine at an early period, they had
settled there, on account of the fertility of the country, and had
driven out the Gauls who inhabited those regions; and that they were the
only people who, in the memory of our fathers, when all Gaul was
overrun, had prevented the Teutones and the Cimbri from entering their
territories; the effect of which was that, from the recollection of
those events, they assumed to themselves great authority and haughtiness
in military matters. The Remi said that they had known accurately
everything respecting their number, because, being united to them by
neighbourhood and by alliances, they had learnt what number each state
had in the general council of the Belgae promised for that war. That the
Bellovaci were the most powerful amongst them in valour, influence, and
number of men; that these could muster 100,000 armed men, [and had]
promised 60,000 picked men out of that number, and demanded for
themselves the command of the whole war. That the Suessiones were their
nearest neighbours and possessed a very extensive and fertile country;
that among them, even in our own memory, Divitiacus, the most powerful
man of all Gaul, had been king; who had held the government of a great
part of these regions, as well as of Britain; that their king at present
was Galba; that the direction of the whole war was conferred by the
consent of all upon him, on account of his integrity and prudence; that
they had twelve towns; that they had promised 50,000 armed men; and that
the Nervii, who are reckoned the most warlike among them, and are
situated at a very great distance, [had promised] as many; the
Atrebates, 15,000; the Ambiani, 10,000; the Morini, 25,000; the Menapu,
9000; the Caleti, 10,000; the Velocasses and the Veromandui as many; the
Aduatuci, 19,000; that the Condrusi, the Eburones, the Caeraesi, the
Paemani, who are called by the common name of Germans, [had promised],
they thought, to the number of 40,000.

V.--Caesar, having encouraged the Remi, and addressed them courteously,
ordered the whole senate to assemble before him, and the children of
their chief men to be brought to him as hostages; all which commands
they punctually performed by the day [appointed]. He, addressing himself
to Divitiacus the Aeduan, with great earnestness, points out how much it
concerns the republic and their common security, that the forces of the
enemy should be divided, so that it might not be necessary to engage
with so large a number at one time. [He asserts] that this might be
effected if the Aedui would lead their forces into the territories of
the Bellovaci, and begin to lay waste their country. With these
instructions he dismissed him from his presence. After he perceived that
all the forces of the Belgae, which had been collected in one place,
were approaching towards him, and learnt from the scouts whom he had
sent out, and [also] from the Remi, that they were not then far distant,
he hastened to lead his army over the Aisne, which is on the borders of
the Remi, and there pitched his camp. This position fortified one side
of his camp by the banks of the river, rendered the country which lay in
his rear secure from the enemy, and furthermore ensured that provisions
might without danger be brought to him by the Remi and the rest of the
states. Over that river was a bridge: there he places a guard; and on
the other side of the river he leaves Q. Titurus Sabinus, his
lieutenant, with six cohorts. He orders him to fortify a camp with a
rampart twelve feet in height, and a trench eighteen feet in breadth.

VI.--There was a town of the Remi, by name Bibrax, eight miles distant
from this camp. This the Belgae on their march began to attack with
great vigour. [The assault] was with difficulty sustained for that day.
The Gauls' mode of besieging is the same as that of the Belgae: when
after having drawn a large number of men around the whole of the
fortifications, stones have begun to be cast against the wall on all
sides, and the wall has been stript of its defenders, [then], forming a
testudo, they advance to the gates and undermine the wall: which was
easily effected on this occasion; for while so large a number were
casting stones and darts, no one was able to maintain his position upon
the wall. When night had put an end to the assault, Iccius, who was then
in command of the town, one of the Remi, a man of the highest rank and
influence amongst his people, and one of those who had come to Caesar as
ambassador [to sue] for a peace, sends messengers to him, [to report]
"That, unless assistance were sent to him, he could not hold out any
longer."

VII.--Thither immediately after midnight, Caesar, using as guides the
same persons who had come to him as messengers from Iccius, sends some
Numidian and Cretan archers, and some Balearian slingers as a relief to
the townspeople, by whose arrival both a desire to resist together with
the hope of [making good their] defence was infused into the Remi, and,
for the same reason, the hope of gaining the town abandoned the enemy.
Therefore, after staying a short time before the town, and laying waste
the country of the Remi, when all the villages and buildings which they
could approach had been burnt, they hastened with all their forces to
the camp of Caesar, and encamped within less than two miles [of it]; and
their camp, as was indicated by the smoke and fires, extended more than
eight miles in breadth.

VIII.--Caesar at first determined to decline a battle, as well on
account of the great number of the enemy as their distinguished
reputation for valour: daily, however, in cavalry actions, he strove to
ascertain by frequent trials what the enemy could effect by their
prowess and what our men would dare. When he perceived that our men were
not inferior, as the place before the camp was naturally convenient and
suitable for marshalling an army (since the hill where the camp was
pitched, rising gradually from the plain, extended forward in breadth as
far as the space which the marshalled army could occupy, and had steep
declines of its side in either direction, and gently sloping in front
gradually sank to the plain), on either side of that hill he drew a
cross trench of about four hundred paces, and at the extremities of that
trench built forts, and placed there his military engines, lest, after
he had marshalled his army, the enemy, since they were so powerful in
point of number, should be able to surround his men in the flank, while
fighting. After doing this, and leaving in the camp the two legions
which he had last raised, that, if there should be any occasion, they
might be brought as a reserve, he formed the other six legions in order
of battle before the camp. The enemy, likewise, had drawn up their
forces which they had brought out of the camp.

IX.--There was a marsh of no great extent between our army and that of
the enemy. The latter were waiting to see if our men would pass this;
our men, also, were ready in arms to attack them while disordered, if
the first attempt to pass should be made by them. In the meantime battle
was commenced between the two armies by a cavalry action. When neither
army began to pass the marsh, Caesar, upon the skirmishes of the horse
[proving] favourable to our men, led back his forces into the camp. The
enemy immediately hastened from that place to the river Aisne, which it
has been stated was behind our camp. Finding a ford there, they
endeavoured to lead a part of their forces over it; with the design,
that, if they could, they might carry by storm the fort which Q.
Titurius, Caesar's lieutenant, commanded, and might cut off the bridge;
but, if they could not do that, they should lay waste the lands of the
Remi, which were of great use to us in carrying on the war, and might
hinder our men from foraging.

X.--Caesar, being apprised of this by Titurius, leads all his cavalry
and light-armed Numidians, slingers and archers, over the bridge, and
hastens towards them. There was a severe struggle in that place. Our
men, attacking in the river the disordered enemy, slew a great part of
them. By the immense number of their missiles they drove back the rest,
who in a most courageous manner were attempting to pass over their
bodies, and surrounded with their cavalry, and cut to pieces those who
had first crossed the river. The enemy, when they perceived that their
hopes had deceived them both with regard to their taking the town by
storm and also their passing the river, and did not see our men advance
to a more disadvantageous place for the purpose of fighting, and when
provisions began to fail them, having called a council, determined that
it was best for each to return to his country, and resolved to assemble
from all quarters to defend those into whose territories the Romans
should first march an army; that they might contend in their own rather
than in a foreign country, and might enjoy the stores of provisions
which they possessed at home. Together with other causes, this
consideration also led them to that resolution, viz.: that they had
learnt that Divitiacus and the Aedui were approaching the territories of
the Bellovaci. And it was impossible to persuade the latter to stay any
longer, or to deter them from conveying succour to their own people.

XI.--That matter being determined on, marching out of their camp at the
second watch, with great noise and confusion, in no fixed order, nor
under any command, since each sought for himself the foremost place in
the journey, and hastened to reach home, they made their departure
appear very like a flight. Caesar, immediately learning this through his
scouts, [but] fearing an ambuscade, because he had not yet discovered
for what reason they were departing, kept h