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The Joy of Revolution
Chapter 2: Foreplay
Personal breakthroughs
Critical interventions
Theory versus ideology
Avoiding false
choices and elucidating real ones
The insurrectionary style
Radical film
Oppressionism versus playfulness
The Strasbourg scandal
The poverty of electoral politics
Reforms and alternative
institutions
Political
correctness, or equal opportunity alienation
Drawbacks of moralism
and simplistic extremism
Advantages of boldness
Advantages and limits of
nonviolence
Chapter 2: Foreplay
“An individual cannot know what he really is until he has realized himself through
action. . . . The interest the individual finds in something is already the
answer to the question of whether he should act and what should be done.”
—Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit
Later on I will try to answer some more of the perennial objections. But as long as the
objectors remain passive, all the arguments in the world will never faze them, and they
will continue to sing the old refrain: “It’s a nice idea, but it’s not
realistic, it goes against human nature, it’s always been this
way. . . .” Those who don’t realize their own potential are
unlikely to recognize the potential of others.
To paraphrase that very sensible old prayer, we need the initiative to solve the
problems we can, the patience to endure the ones we can’t, and the wisdom to know the
difference. But we also need to bear in mind that some problems that can’t be solved
by isolated individuals can be solved collectively. Discovering that others share the same
problem is often the beginning of a solution.
Some problems can, of course, be solved individually, through a variety of methods
ranging from elaborate therapies or spiritual practices to simple commonsense decisions to
correct some mistake, break some harmful habit, try something new, etc. But my concern
here is not with purely personal makeshifts, worthwhile though they may be within their
limits, but with moments where people move “outward” in deliberately subversive
ventures.
There are more possibilities than appear at first sight. Once you refuse to be
intimidated, some of them are quite simple. You can begin anywhere. And you have to begin
somewhere — do you think you can learn to swim if you never go in the water?
Sometimes a little action is needed to cut through excessive verbiage and reestablish a
concrete perspective. It needn’t be anything momentous; if nothing else comes to
mind, some rather arbitrary venture may suffice — just enough to shake things up a
bit and wake yourself up.
At other times it’s necessary to stop, to break the chain of compulsive actions
and reactions. To clear the air, to create a little space free from the cacophony of the
spectacle. Just about everyone does this to some degree, out of instinctive psychological
self-defense, whether by practicing some form of meditation, or by periodically engaging
in some activity that effectively serves the same purpose (working in one’s garden,
taking a walk, going fishing), or simply by pausing to take a deep breath amid their daily
round, coming back for a moment to the “quiet center.” Without such a space it
is difficult to get a sane perspective on the world, or even simply to keep one’s own
sanity.
One of the methods I have found most useful is to put things in writing. The advantage
is partly psychological (some problems lose their power over us by being set out where we
can see them more objectively), partly a matter of organizing our thoughts so as to see
the different factors and choices more clearly. We often maintain inconsistent notions
without becoming aware of their contradictions until we try putting them down on paper.
I have sometimes been criticized for exaggerating the importance of writing. Many
matters can, of course, be dealt with more directly. But even nonverbal actions require
thinking about, talking about, and usually writing about, if they are to be effectively
carried out, communicated, debated, corrected.
(In any case, I don’t claim to cover everything; I am merely discussing certain
points about which I feel I have something to say. If you think I have failed to address
some important topic, why don’t you do it yourself?)
Writing enables you to work out your ideas at your own pace, without worrying about
oratorical skills or stage fright. You can make a point once and for all instead of having
to constantly repeat yourself. If discretion is necessary, a text can be issued
anonymously. People can read it at their own pace, stop and think about it, go
back and check specific points, reproduce it, adapt it, refer others to it. Talking may
generate quicker and more detailed feedback, but it can also disperse your energy, prevent
you from focusing and implementing your ideas. Those in the same rut as you may resist
your efforts to escape because your success would challenge their own passivity.
Sometimes you can best provoke such people by simply leaving them behind and pursuing
your own course. (“Hey, wait for me!”) Or by shifting the dialogue to a
different level. A letter forces both writer and addressee to work out their ideas more
clearly. Copies to others concerned may enliven the discussion. An open letter draws in
even more people.
If you succeed in creating a chain reaction in which more and more people read your
text because they see others reading it and heatedly discussing it, it will no longer be
possible for anyone to pretend to be unaware of the issues you have raised.(1)
Suppose, for example, that you criticize a group for being hierarchical, for allowing a
leader to have power over members (or followers or fans). A private talk with one of the
members might merely meet with a series of contradictory defensive reactions with which it
is fruitless to argue. (“No, he’s not really our leader. . . .
And even if he is, he’s not authoritarian. . . . And besides, what
right do you have to criticize?”) But a public critique forces such contradictions
into the open and puts people in a crossfire. While one member denies that the group is
hierarchical, a second may admit that it is and attempt to justify this by attributing
superior insight to the leader. This may cause a third member to start thinking.
At first, annoyed that you have disturbed their cozy little scene, the group is likely
to close ranks around the leader and denounce you for your “negativity” or
“elitist arrogance.” But if your intervention has been acute enough, it may
continue to sink in and have a delayed impact. The leader now has to watch his step since
everyone is more sensitive to anything that might seem to confirm your critique. In order
to demonstrate how unjustified you are, the members may insist on greater democratization.
Even if the particular group proves impervious to change, its example may serve as an
object lesson for a wider public. Outsiders who might otherwise have made similar mistakes
can more easily see the pertinence of your critique because they have less emotional
investment.
It’s usually more effective to criticize institutions and ideologies than to
attack individuals who merely happen to be caught up in them — not only because the
machine is more crucial than its replaceable parts, but because this approach makes it
easier for individuals to save face while dissociating themselves from the machine.
But however tactful you may be, there’s no getting around the fact that virtually
any significant critique will provoke irrational defensive reactions, ranging from
personal attacks on you to invocations of one or another of the many fashionable
ideologies that seem to demonstrate the impossibility of any rational consideration of
social problems. Reason is denounced as cold and abstract by demagogues who find it easier
to play on people’s feelings; theory is scorned in the name of
practice. . . .
To theorize is simply to try to understand what we are doing. We are all theorists
whenever we honestly discuss what has happened, distinguish between the significant and
the irrelevant, see through fallacious explanations, recognize what worked and what
didn’t, consider how something might be done better next time. Radical theorizing is
simply talking or writing to more people about more general issues in more abstract (i.e.
more widely applicable) terms. Even those who claim to reject theory theorize — they
merely do so more unconsciously and capriciously, and thus more inaccurately.
Theory without particulars is empty, but particulars without theory are blind. Practice
tests theory, but theory also inspires new practice.
Radical theory has nothing to respect and nothing to lose. It criticizes itself along
with everything else. It is not a doctrine to be accepted on faith, but a tentative
generalization that people must constantly test and correct for themselves, a practical
simplification indispensable for dealing with the complexities of reality.
But hopefully not an oversimplification. Any theory can turn into an ideology, become
rigidified into a dogma, be twisted to hierarchical ends. A sophisticated ideology may be
relatively accurate in certain respects; what differentiates it from theory is that it
lacks a dynamic relation to practice. Theory is when you have ideas; ideology is when
ideas have you. “Seek simplicity, and distrust it.”
We have to face the fact that there are no foolproof gimmicks, that no radical tactic
is invariably appropriate. Something that is collectively possible during a revolt may not
be a sensible option for an isolated individual. In certain urgent situations it may be
necessary to urge people to take some specific action; but in most cases it is best simply
to elucidate relevant factors that people should take into account when making their own
decisions. (If I occasionally presume to offer direct advice here, this is for convenience
of expression. “Do this” should be understood as “In some circumstances it
may be a good idea to do this.”)
A social analysis need not be long or detailed. Simply “dividing one into
two” (pointing out contradictory tendencies within a given phenomenon or group or
ideology) or “combining two into one” (revealing a commonality between two
apparently distinct entities) may be useful, especially if communicated to those most
directly involved. More than enough information is already available on most issues; what
is needed is to cut through the glut in order to reveal the essential. Once this is done,
other people, including knowledgeable insiders, will be spurred to more thorough
investigations if these are necessary.
When confronted with a given topic, the first thing is to determine whether it is
indeed a single topic. It’s impossible to have any meaningful discussion of
“Marxism” or “violence” or “technology” without
distinguishing the diverse senses that are lumped under such labels.
On the other hand, it can also be useful to take some broad, abstract category and show
its predominant tendencies, even though such a pure type does not actually exist. The
situationists’ Student Poverty pamphlet, for example, scathingly enumerates
all sorts of stupidities and pretensions of “the student.” Obviously not every
student is guilty of all these faults, but the stereotype serves as a focus around which
to organize a systematic critique of general tendencies. By stressing qualities most
students have in common, the pamphlet also implicitly challenges those who claim to be
exceptions to prove it. The same applies to the critique of “the pro-situ” in
Debord and Sanguinetti’s The Real Split in the International — a
challenging rebuff of followers perhaps unique in the history of radical movements.
“Everyone is asked their opinion about every detail in order to prevent them from
forming one about the totality” (Vaneigem). Many issues are such emotionally loaded
tar-babies that anyone who reacts to them becomes entangled in false choices. The fact
that two sides are in conflict, for example, does not mean that you must support one or
the other. If you cannot do anything about a particular problem, it is best to clearly
acknowledge this fact and move on to something that does present practical possibilities.(2)
If you do decide to choose a lesser evil, admit it; don’t add to the confusion by
whitewashing your choice or demonizing the enemy. If anything, it’s better to do the
opposite: to play devil’s advocate and neutralize compulsive polemical delirium by
calmly examining the strong points of the opposing position and the weaknesses in your
own. “A very popular error: having the courage of one’s convictions; the point
is to have the courage for an attack on one’s convictions!”
(Nietzsche).
Combine modesty with audacity. Remember that if you happen to accomplish anything it is
on the foundation of the efforts of countless others, many of whom have faced horrors that
would make you or me crumple into submission. But don’t forget that what you say can
make a difference: within a world of pacified spectators even a little autonomous
expression will stand out.
Since there are no longer any material obstacles to inaugurating a classless society,
the problem has been essentially reduced to a question of consciousness: the only thing
that really stands in the way is people’s unawareness of their own collective power.
(Physical repression is effective against radical minorities only so long as social
conditioning keeps the rest of the population docile.) Hence a large element of radical
practice is negative: attacking the various forms of false consciousness that
prevent people from realizing their positive potentialities.
Both Marx and the situationists have often been ignorantly denounced for such
negativity, because they concentrated primarily on critical clarification and deliberately
avoided promoting any positive ideology to which people could passively cling. Because
Marx pointed out how capitalism reduces our lives to an economic rat-race,
“idealistic” apologists for this state of affairs accuse him of
“reducing life to materialistic concerns” — as if the whole point of
Marx’s work was not to help us get beyond our economic slavery so that our more
creative potentials can flower. “To call on people to give up their illusions about
their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions.
. . . Criticism plucks the imaginary flowers from the chain not in order that
man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but so that he will
throw off the chain and pluck the living flower” (“Introduction to a Critique of
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right”).
Accurately expressing a key issue often has a surprisingly powerful effect. Bringing
things out into the open forces people to stop hedging their bets and take a position.
Like the dexterous butcher in the Taoist fable whose knife never needed sharpening because
he always cut between the joints, the most effective radical polarization comes not from
strident protest, but from simply revealing the divisions that already exist, elucidating
the different tendencies, contradictions, choices. Much of the situationists’ impact
stemmed from the fact that they articulated things that most people had already
experienced but were unable or afraid to express until someone else broke the ice.
(“Our ideas are in everybody’s mind.”)
If some situationist texts nevertheless seem difficult at first, this is because their
dialectical structure goes against the grain of our conditioning. When this conditioning
is broken they don’t seem so obscure (they were the source of some of the most
popular May 1968 graffiti). Many academic spectators have floundered around trying
unsuccessfully to resolve the various “contradictory” descriptions of the
spectacle in The Society of the Spectacle
into some single, “scientifically consistent” definition; but anyone engaged in
contesting this society will find Debord’s examination of it from different angles
eminently clear and useful, and come to appreciate the fact that he never wastes a word in
academic inanities or pointless expressions of outrage.
The dialectical method that runs from Hegel and Marx to the situationists is not a
magic formula for churning out correct predictions, it is a tool for grappling with the
dynamic processes of social change. It reminds us that social concepts are not eternal;
that they contain their own contradictions, interacting with and transforming each other,
even into their opposites; that what is true or progressive in one context may become
false or regressive in another.(3)
A dialectical text may require careful study, but each new reading brings new
discoveries. Even if it influences only a few people directly, it tends to influence them
so profoundly that many of them end up influencing others in the same way, leading to a
qualitative chain reaction. The nondialectical language of leftist propaganda is easier to
understand, but its effect is usually superficial and ephemeral; offering no challenge, it
soon ends up boring even the stupefied spectators for whom it is designed.
As Debord put it in his last film, those who find what he says too difficult would do
better to blame their own ignorance and passivity, and the schools and society that have
made them that way, than to complain about his obscurity. Those who don’t have enough
initiative to reread crucial texts or to do a little exploration or a little
experimentation for themselves are unlikely to accomplish anything if they are spoonfed by
someone else.
Debord is in fact virtually the only person who has made a truly dialectical
and antispectacular use of film [see
Guy Debord’s Films]. Although would-be radical filmmakers often give lip service
to Brechtian “distanciation” — the notion of encouraging spectators to
think and act for themselves rather than sucking them into passive identification with
hero or plot — most radical films still play to the audience as if it were made up of
morons. The dimwitted protagonist gradually “discovers oppression” and becomes
“radicalized” to the point where he is ready to become a fervent supporter of
“progressive” politicians or a loyal militant in some bureaucratic leftist
group. Distanciation is limited to a few token gimmicks that allow the spectator to think:
“Ah, a Brechtian touch! What a clever fellow that filmmaker is! And how clever am I
to recognize such subtleties!” The radical message is usually so banal that it is
obvious to virtually anyone who would ever go to see such a film in the first place; but
the spectator gets the gratifying impression that other people might be brought
up to his level of awareness if only they could be got to see it.
If the spectator has any uneasiness about the quality of what he is consuming, it is
assuaged by the critics, whose main function is to read profound radical meanings into
practically any film. As with the Emperor’s New Clothes, no one is likely to admit
that he wasn’t aware of these supposed meanings until informed of them, for fear that
this would reveal him as less sophisticated than the rest of the audience.
Certain films may help expose some deplorable condition or convey some sense of the
feel of a radical situation. But there is little point in presenting images of a struggle
if both the images and the struggle are not criticized. Spectators sometimes complain that
a film portrays some social category (e.g. women) inaccurately. This may be true insofar
as the film reproduces certain false stereotypes; but the usually implied alternative
— that the filmmaker “should have presented images of women struggling against
oppression” — would in most cases be equally false to reality. Women (like men
or any other oppressed group) have in fact usually been passive and submissive —
that’s precisely the problem we have to face. Catering to people’s
self-satisfaction by presenting spectacles of triumphant radical heroism only reinforces
this bondage.
To rely on oppressive conditions to radicalize people is unwise; to intentionally
worsen them in order to accelerate this process is unacceptable. The repression of certain
radical projects may incidentally expose the absurdity of the ruling order; but such
projects should be worthwhile for their own sake — they lose their credibility if
they are merely pretexts designed to provoke repression. Even in the most
“privileged” milieus there are usually more than enough problems without needing
to add to them. The point is to reveal the contrast between present conditions
and present possibilities; to give people enough taste of real life that
they’ll want more.
Leftists often imply that a lot of simplification, exaggeration and repetition is
necessary in order to counteract all the ruling propaganda in the other direction. This is
like saying that a boxer who has been made groggy by a right hook will be restored to
lucidity by a left hook.
People’s consciousness is not “raised” by burying them under an
avalanche of horror stories, or even under an avalanche of information. Information that
is not critically assimilated and used is soon forgotten. Mental as well as physical
health requires some balance between what we take in and what we do with it. It may
sometimes be necessary to force complacent people to face some outrage they are unaware
of, but even in such cases harping on the same thing ad nauseam usually accomplishes
nothing more than driving them to escape to less boring and depressing spectacles.
One of the main things that keeps us from understanding our situation is the spectacle
of other people’s apparent happiness, which makes us see our own unhappiness as a
shameful sign of failure. But an omnipresent spectacle of misery also keeps us from seeing
our positive potentials. The constant broadcasting of delirious ideas and nauseating
atrocities paralyzes us, turns us into paranoids and compulsive cynics.
Strident leftist propaganda, fixating on the insidiousness and loathsomeness of
“oppressors,” often feeds this delirium, appealing to the most morbid and
mean-spirited side of people. If we get caught up in brooding on evils, if we let the
sickness and ugliness of this society pervade even our rebellion against it, we forget
what we are fighting for and end up losing the very capacity to love, to create, to enjoy.
The best “radical art” cuts both ways. If it attacks the alienation of modern
life, it simultaneously reminds us of the poetic potentialities hidden within it. Rather
than reinforcing our tendency to wallow in self-pity, it encourages our resilience,
enables us to laugh at our own troubles as well as at the asininities of the forces of
“order.” Some of the old IWW songs and comic strips are good examples, even if
the IWW ideology is by now a bit musty. Or the ironic, bittersweet songs of Brecht and
Weill. The hilarity of The Good Soldier Svejk is probably a more effective
antidote to war than the moral outrage of the typical antiwar tract.
Nothing undermines authority like holding it up to ridicule. The most effective
argument against a repressive regime is not that it is evil, but that it is silly. The
protagonists of Albert Cossery’s novel La violence et la dérision, living
under a Middle-Eastern dictatorship, plaster the walls of the capital with an
official-looking poster that praises the dictator to such a preposterous degree that he
becomes a laughingstock and is forced to resign out of embarrassment. Cosséry’s
pranksters are apolitical and their success is perhaps too good to be true, but somewhat
similar parodies have been used with more radical aims (e.g. the Li I-Che coup mentioned
on page 304 [A Radical Group in Hong Kong]). At demonstrations
in Italy in the 1970s the Metropolitan Indians (inspired perhaps by the opening chapter of
Lewis Carroll’s Sylvie and Bruno: “Less Bread! More Taxes!”)
carried banners and chanted slogans such as “Power to the Bosses!” and
“More work! Less pay!” Everyone recognized the irony, but it was harder to
dismiss with the usual pigeonholing.
Humor is a healthy antidote to all types of orthodoxy, left as well as right. It’s
highly contagious and it reminds us not to take ourselves too seriously. But it can easily
become a mere safety valve, channeling dissatisfaction into glib, passive cynicism.
Spectacle society thrives on delirious reactions against its most delirious aspects.
Satirists often have a dependent, love-hate relation with their targets; parodies become
indistinguishable from what they are parodying, giving the impression that everything is
equally bizarre, meaningless and hopeless.
In a society based on artificially maintained confusion, the first task is not to add
to it. Chaotic disruptions usually generate nothing but annoyance or panic, provoking
people to support whatever measures the government takes to restore order. A radical
intervention may at first seem strange and incomprehensible; but if it has been worked out
with sufficient lucidity, people will soon understand it well enough.
Imagine being at Strasbourg University at the opening of the school year in fall 1966,
among the students, faculty and distinguished guests filing into an auditorium to hear
a commencement address. You find a little pamphlet placed on each
seat. A program? No, something about “the poverty of student life.” You idly
open it up and start to read: “It is pretty safe to say that the student is the most
universally despised creature in France, apart from the policeman and the
priest. . . .” You look around and see that everyone else is also
reading it, reactions ranging from puzzlement or amusement to shock and outrage. Who is
responsible for this? The title page reveals that it is published by the Strasbourg
Student Union, but it also refers to “the Situationist International,” whatever
that might be. . . .
What made the Strasbourg scandal different from some college prank, or from the
confused and confusing capers of groups like the Yippies, was that its scandalous form
conveyed an equally scandalous content. At a moment when students were being proclaimed as
the most radical sector of society, this text was the only one that put things into
perspective. But the particular poverties of students just happened to be the point of
departure; equally scathing texts could and should be written on the poverty of every
other segment of society (preferably by those who know them from inside). Some have in
fact been attempted, but none have approached the lucidity and coherence of the
situationist pamphlet, so concise yet so comprehensive, so provocative yet so accurate,
moving so methodically from a specific situation through increasingly general
ramifications that the final chapter presents the most pithy existing summary of the
modern revolutionary project. (See SI Anthology, pp. 204-212, 319-337 [On the Poverty of Student Life and Our Goals and Methods in the Strasbourg Scandal].)
The situationists never claimed to have single-handedly provoked May 1968 — as
they said, they predicted the content of the revolt, not the date or location. But without
the Strasbourg scandal and the subsequent agitation by the SI-influenced Enragés group
(of which the more well known March 22nd Movement was only a belated and confused
imitation) the revolt might never have happened. There was no economic or governmental
crisis, no war or racial antagonism destabilizing the country, nor any other particular
issue that might have fostered such a revolt. There were more radical worker struggles
going on in Italy and England, more militant student struggles in Germany and Japan, more
widespread countercultural movements in the United States and the Netherlands. But only in
France was there a perspective that tied them all together.
Carefully calculated interventions like the Strasbourg scandal must be distinguished
not only from confusionistic disruptions, but also from merely spectacular exposés. As
long as social critics confine themselves to contesting this or that detail, the
spectacle-spectator relation continually reconstitutes itself: if such critics succeed in
discrediting existing political leaders, they themselves often become new stars (Ralph
Nader, Noam Chomsky, etc.) whom slightly more aware spectators admiringly rely on for a
continuing flow of shocking information that they rarely do anything about. The milder
exposés get the audience to root for this or that faction in intragovernmental power
struggles; the more sensational ones feed people’s morbid curiosity, sucking them
into consuming more articles, news programs and docudramas, and into interminable debates
about various conspiracy theories. Most such theories are obviously nothing but delirious
reflections of the lack of critical historical sense produced by the modern spectacle,
desperate attempts to find some coherent meaning in an increasingly incoherent and absurd
society. In any case, as long as things remain on the spectacular terrain it hardly
matters whether any of these theories are true: those who keep watching to see what
comes next never affect what comes next.
Certain revelations are more interesting because they not only open up significant
issues to public debate, but do so in a manner that draws lots of people into the game. A
charming example is the 1963 “Spies for Peace” scandal in England, in which a
few unknown persons publicized the location of a secret bomb shelter reserved for members
of the government. The more vehemently the government threatened to prosecute anyone who
reproduced this “state secret” information which was no longer secret from
anyone, the more creatively and playfully it was disseminated by thousands of groups and
individuals (who also proceeded to discover and invade several other secret shelters). Not
only did the asininity of the government and the insanity of the nuclear war spectacle
became evident to everyone, the spontaneous human chain reaction provided a taste of a
quite different social potential.
“Since 1814 no Liberal government had come in except by violence. Cánovas was
too intelligent not to see the inconvenience and the danger of that. He therefore arranged
that Conservative governments should be succeeded regularly by Liberal governments. The
plan he followed was, whenever an economic crisis or a serious strike came along, to
resign and let the Liberals deal with it. This explains why most of the repressive
legislation passed during the rest of the century was passed by them.”
—Gerald Brenan, The Spanish Labyrinth
The best argument in favor of radical electoral politics was made by Eugene Debs, the
American socialist leader who in 1920 received nearly a million votes for president while
in prison for opposing World War I: “If the people don’t know enough to know who
to vote for, they’re not going to know who to shoot at.” On the other hand, the
workers during the 1918-19 German revolution were confused about who to shoot at
precisely by the presence of “socialist” leaders in the government who were
working overtime to repress the revolution.
In itself, voting is of no great significance one way or the other (those who make a
big deal about refusing to vote are only revealing their own fetishism). The problem is
that it tends to lull people into relying on others to act for them, distracting them from
more significant possibilities. A few people who take some creative initiative (think of
the first civil rights sit-ins) may ultimately have a far greater effect than if they had
put their energy into campaigning for lesser-evil politicians. At best, legislators rarely
do more than what they have been forced to do by popular movements. A conservative regime
under pressure from independent radical movements often concedes more than a liberal
regime that knows it can count on radical support. If people invariably rally to lesser
evils, all the rulers have to do in any situation that threatens their power is to conjure
up a threat of some greater evil.
Even in the rare case when a “radical” politician has a realistic chance of
winning an election, all the tedious campaign efforts of thousands of people may go down
the drain in one day because of some trivial scandal discovered in his personal life, or
because he inadvertently says something intelligent. If he manages to avoid these pitfalls
and it looks like he might win, he tends to evade controversial issues for fear of
antagonizing swing voters. If he actually gets elected he is almost never in a position to
implement the reforms he has promised, except perhaps after years of wheeling and dealing
with his new colleagues; which gives him a good excuse to see his first priority as making
whatever compromises are necessary to keep himself in office indefinitely. Hobnobbing with
the rich and powerful, he develops new interests and new tastes, which he justifies by
telling himself that he deserves a few perks after all his years of working for good
causes. Worst of all, if he does eventually manage to get a few “progressive”
measures passed, this exceptional and usually trivial success is held up as evidence of
the value of relying on electoral politics, luring many more people into wasting their
energy on similar campaigns to come.
As one of the May 1968 graffiti put it, “It’s painful to submit to our
bosses; it’s even more stupid to choose them!”
Referendums on particular issues are less susceptible to the precariousness of
personalities; but the results are often no better since the issues tend to be posed very
simplistically, and any measure that threatens powerful interests can usually be defeated
by the influence of money and mass media.
Local elections sometimes offer people a more realistic chance to affect policies and
keep tabs on elected officials. But even the most enlightened communities cannot insulate
themselves from the deterioration of the rest of the world. If a city manages to preserve
desirable cultural or environmental features, these very advantages put it under
increasing economic pressure. The fact that human values have been given precedence over
property values ultimately causes enormous increases in the latter (more people will want
to invest or move there). Sooner or later this property-value increase overpowers the
human values: local policies are overruled by high courts or by state or national
governments, outside money is poured into municipal elections, city officials are bribed,
residential neighborhoods are demolished to make room for highrises and freeways, rents
skyrocket, the poorer classes are forced out (including the diverse ethnic groups and
artistic bohemians who contributed to the city’s original liveliness and appeal), and
all that remains of the earlier community are a few isolated sites of “historical
interest” for tourist consumption.
Still, “acting locally” may be a good place to start. People who feel that
the global situation is hopeless or incomprehensible may nevertheless see a chance to
affect some specific local matter. Block clubs, co-ops, switchboards, study groups,
alternative schools, free health clinics, community theaters, neighborhood newspapers,
public-access radio and television stations and many other kinds of alternative
institutions are worthwhile for their own sake, and if they are sufficiently participatory
they may lead to broader movements. Even if they don’t last very long, they provide a
temporary terrain for radical experimentation.
But always within limits. Capitalism was able to develop gradually within feudal
society, so that by the time the capitalist revolution cast off the last vestiges of
feudalism, most of the mechanisms of the new bourgeois order were already firmly in place.
An anticapitalist revolution, in contrast, cannot really build its new society
“within the shell of the old.” Capitalism is far more flexible and all-pervading
than was feudalism, and tends to coopt any oppositional organization.
Nineteenth-century radical theorists could still see enough surviving remnants of
traditional communal forms to suppose that, once the overarching exploitive structure was
eliminated, they might be revived and expanded to form the foundation of a new society.
But the global penetration of spectacular capitalism in the present century has destroyed
virtually all forms of popular control and direct human interaction. Even the more modern
efforts of the sixties counterculture have long been integrated into the system. Co-ops,
crafts, organic farming and other marginal enterprises may produce better quality goods
under better working conditions, but those goods still have to function as commodities on
the market. The few successful ventures tend to evolve into ordinary businesses, with the
founding members gradually assuming an ownership or managerial role over the newer workers
and dealing with all sorts of routine commercial and bureaucratic matters that have
nothing to do with “preparing the ground for a new society.”
The longer an alternative institution lasts, the more it tends to lose its volunteer,
experimental, nothing-to-lose character. Permanent paid staffs develop a vested interest
in the status quo and avoid rocking the boat for fear of offending supporters or losing
their government or foundation funding. Alternative institutions also tend to demand too
much of the limited free time people have, bogging them down, robbing them of the energy
and imagination to confront more general issues. After a brief period of participation
most people get burned out, leaving the work to the dutiful types or to leftists trying to
make an ideological point. It may sound nice to hear about people forming block clubs,
etc., but unless a real local emergency comes up you may not want to attend
interminable meetings to listen to your neighbors’ complaints, or otherwise commit
yourself to matters you don’t really care about.
In the name of realism, reformists limit themselves to pursuing “winnable”
objectives, yet even when they win some little adjustment in the system it is usually
offset by some other development at another level. This doesn’t mean that reforms are
irrelevant, merely that they are insufficient. We have to keep resisting particular evils,
but we also have to recognize that the system will keep generating new ones until we put
an end to it. To suppose that a series of reforms will eventually add up to a qualitative
change is like thinking we can get across a ten-foot chasm by a series of one-foot hops.
People tend to assume that because revolution involves much greater change than
reforms, it must be more difficult to bring about. In the long run it may actually be
easier, because in one stroke it cuts through so many petty complications and arouses a
much greater enthusiasm. At a certain point it becomes more practical to start fresh than
to keep trying to replaster a rotten structure.
Meanwhile, until a revolutionary situation enables us to be truly constructive, the
best we can do is be creatively negative — concentrating on critical
clarification, leaving people to pursue whatever positive projects may appeal to them but
without the illusion that a new society is being “built” by the gradual
accumulation of such projects.
Purely negative projects (e.g. abolition of laws against drug use, consensual sex and
other victimless crimes) have the advantage of simplicity, immediately benefiting
virtually everyone (except for that symbiotic duo, organized crime and the crime-control
industry) while requiring little if any followup work once they are successful. On the
other hand, they provide little opportunity for creative participation.
The best projects are those that are worthwhile for their own sake while simultaneously
containing an implicit challenge to some fundamental aspect of the system; projects that
enable people to participate in significant issues according to their own degree of
interest, while tending to open the way to more radical possibilities.
Less interesting, but still worthwhile, are demands for improved conditions or more
equal rights. Even if such projects are not in themselves very participatory, they may
remove impediments to participation.
Least desirable are mere zero-sum struggles, where one group’s gain is
another’s loss.
Even in the latter case the point is not to tell people what they should do, but to get
them to realize what they are doing. If they are promoting some issue in order to recruit
people, it is appropriate to expose their manipulative motives. If they believe they are
contributing to radical change, it may be useful to show them how their activity is
actually reinforcing the system in some way. But if they are really interested in their
project for its own sake, let them go for it.
Even if we disagree with their priorities (fundraising for the opera, say, while the
streets are filled with homeless people) we should be wary of any strategy that merely
appeals to people’s guilt, not only because such appeals generally have a negligible
effect but because such moralism represses healthy positive aspirations. To refrain from
contesting “quality of life” issues because the system continues to present us
with survival emergencies is to submit to a blackmail that no longer has any
justification. “Bread and roses” are no longer mutually exclusive.(4)
“Quality of life” projects are in fact often more inspiring than routine
political and economic demands because they awaken people to richer perspectives. Paul
Goodman’s books are full of imaginative and often amusing examples. If his proposals
are “reformist,” they are so in a lively, provocative way that provides a
refreshing contrast to the cringing defensive posture of most present-day reformists, who
confine themselves to reacting to the reactionaries’ agenda. (“We agree that it
is essential to create jobs, fight crime, keep our country strong; but moderate methods
will accomplish this better than the conservatives’ extremist proposals.”)
Other things being equal, it makes sense to concentrate one’s energy on issues
that are not already receiving public attention; and to prefer projects that can be done
cleanly and directly, as opposed to those that require compromises, such as working
through government agencies. Even if such compromises don’t seem too serious, they
set a bad precedent. Reliance on the state almost always backfires (commissions designed
to root out bureaucratic corruption themselves develop into new corrupt bureaucracies;
laws designed to thwart armed reactionary groups end up being used primarily to harass
unarmed radicals).
The system is able to kill two birds with one stone by maneuvering its opponents into
offering “constructive solutions” to its own crises. It in fact needs a certain
amount of opposition to warn it of problems, to force it to rationalize itself, to enable
it to test its instruments of control, and to provide excuses to impose new forms of
control. Emergency measures imperceptibly become standard procedures as regulations that
might ordinarily be resisted are introduced during situations of panic. The slow, steady
rape of the human personality by all the institutions of alienated society, from school
and factory to advertising and urbanism, is made to seem normal as the spectacle focuses
obsessively on sensational individual crimes, manipulating people into law-and-order
hysteria.
Above all, the system thrives when it can deflect social contestation into squabbles
over privileged positions within it.
This is a particularly thorny area. All social inequalities need to be challenged, not
only because they are unfair, but because as long as they remain they can be used to
divide people. But attaining equal wage slavery or equal opportunity to become a
bureaucrat or a capitalist hardly amounts to any victory over bureaucratic capitalism.
It is both natural and necessary that people defend their own interests; but if they
try do so by identifying too exclusively with some particular social group they tend to
lose sight of the larger picture. As increasingly fragmented categories scramble over the
crumbs allotted to them, they get caught up in petty mutual-blame games and the notion of
abolishing the whole hierarchical structure is forgotten. People who are normally quick to
denounce the slightest hint of derogatory stereotyping get carried away into lumping all
men or all whites as “oppressors,” then wonder why they run up against such
powerful backlashes among the vast majority of the latter, who are quite aware that they
have little real power over their own lives, much less over anyone else’s.
Aside from the reactionary demagogues (who are pleasantly surprised to find
“progressives” providing them with such easy targets for ridicule) the only
people who actually benefit from these internecine squabbles are a few careerists
struggling for bureaucratic posts, government grants, academic tenure, publishing
contracts, commercial clienteles or political constituencies at a time when there is
increasingly limited space at the trough. Sniffing out “political incorrectness”
enables them to bash rivals and critics and reinforce their own positions as recognized
specialists or spokespeople of their particular fragment. The various oppressed groups
that are foolish enough to accept such spokespeople get nothing but the bittersweet thrill
of self-righteous resentment and a ludicrous official terminology reminiscent of
Orwell’s Newspeak.(5)
There is a crucial, though sometimes subtle, distinction between fighting social evils
and feeding on them. People are not empowered by being encouraged to wallow in
their own victimhood. Individual autonomy is not developed by taking refuge in some group
identity. Equal intelligence is not demonstrated by dismissing logical reasoning as a
“typical white male tactic.” Radical dialogue is not fostered by harassing
people who don’t conform to some political orthodoxy, much less by striving to get
such orthodoxy legally enforced.
Nor is history made by rewriting it. We do need to free ourselves from uncritical
respect for the past and to become aware of the ways it has been distorted. But we have to
recognize that despite our disapproval of past prejudices and injustices, it is unlikely
that we would have done any better had we ourselves lived under the same conditions.
Applying present-day standards retroactively (smugly correcting earlier authors every time
they use the formerly conventional masculine forms, or trying to censor Huckleberry
Finn because Huck doesn’t refer to Jim as a “person of color”) only
reinforces the historical ignorance that the modern spectacle has been so successful in
fostering.
A lot of this nonsense stems from the false assumption that being radical implies
living up to some moral “principle” — as if no one could work for peace
without being a total pacifist, or advocate the abolition of capitalism without giving
away all their money. Most people have too much common sense to actually follow such
simplistic ideals, but they often feel vaguely guilty that they don’t. This guilt
paralyzes them and makes them more susceptible to blackmail by leftist manipulators (who
tell us that if we don’t have the courage to martyrize ourselves, we must
uncritically support those who do). Or they try to repress their guilt by disparaging
others who seem even more compromised: a manual laborer may take pride in not selling out
mentally like a professor; who perhaps feels superior to an ad designer; who may in turn
look down on someone who works in the arms industry. . . .
Turning social problems into personal moral issues deflects attention from their
potential solution. Trying to change social conditions by charity is like trying to raise
the sea level by dumping buckets of water in the ocean. Even if some good is accomplished
by altruistic actions, to rely on them as a general strategy is futile because they will
always be the exception. Most people naturally look out first for themselves and for those
closest to them. One of the merits of the situationists was to have cut through the
traditional leftist appeal to guilt and self-sacrifice by stressing that the primary
reason to make a revolution is for ourselves.
“Going to the people” in order to “serve” or “organize”
or “radicalize” them usually leads to manipulation and often meets with apathy
or hostility. The example of others’ independent actions is a far stronger and
healthier means of inspiration. Once people begin to act on their own they are in a better
position to exchange experiences, to collaborate on equal terms and, if necessary, to ask
for specific assistance. And when they win their own freedom it’s much harder to take
it back from them. One of the May 1968 graffitists wrote: “I’m not a servant of
the people (much less of their self-appointed leaders) — let the people serve
themselves.” Another put it even more succinctly: “Don’t liberate me —
I’ll take care of that.”
A total critique means that everything is called into question, not that everything
must be totally opposed. Radicals often forget this and get caught up in outbidding each
other with increasingly extremist assertions, implying that any compromise amounts to
selling out or even that any enjoyment amounts to complicity with the system. Actually,
being “for” or “against” some political position is just as easy, and
usually just as meaningless, as being for or against some sports team. Those who proudly
proclaim their “total opposition” to all compromise, all authority, all
organization, all theory, all technology, etc., usually turn out to have no revolutionary
perspective whatsoever — no practical conception of how the present system might be
overthrown or how a postrevolutionary society might work. Some even attempt to justify
this lack by declaring that a mere revolution could never be radical enough to satisfy
their eternal ontological rebelliousness.
Such all-or-nothing bombast may temporarily impress a few spectators, but its ultimate
effect is simply to make people blasé. Sooner or later the contradictions and hypocrisies
lead to disillusionment and resignation. Projecting their own disappointed delusions onto
the world, the former extremists conclude that all radical change is hopeless and repress
the whole experience; or perhaps even flip to some equally silly reactionary position.
If every radical had to be a Durruti we might as well forget it and devote ourselves to
more realizable concerns. But being radical does not mean being the most extreme. In its
original sense it simply means going to the root. The reason it is necessary to strive for
the abolition of capitalism and the state is not because this is the most extreme goal
imaginable, but because it has unfortunately become evident that nothing less will do.
We need to find out what is both necessary and sufficient; to seek projects that we are
actually capable of doing and realistically likely to do. Anything beyond this is just hot
air. Many of the oldest and still most effective radical tactics — debates,
critiques, boycotts, strikes, sit-ins, workers councils — caught on precisely because
they are at once simple, relatively safe, widely applicable, and open-ended enough to lead
to broader possibilities.
Simplistic extremism naturally seeks the most extremist foil for itself. If all
problems can be attributed to a sinister clique of “total fascists,” everything
else will seem comfortingly progressive by comparison. Meanwhile the actual forms of
modern domination, which are usually more subtle, proceed unnoticed and unopposed.
Fixating on reactionaries only reinforces them, makes them seem more powerful and more
fascinating. “It matters little if our opponents mock us or insult us, if they
represent us as clowns or criminals; the essential thing is that they talk of us,
preoccupy themselves with us” (Hitler). Reich pointed out that “by drilling
people to hate the police one only strengthens police authority and invests it with mystic
power in the eyes of the poor and the helpless. The strong are hated but also feared and
envied and followed. This fear and envy felt by the ‘have-nots’ accounts for a
portion of the political reactionaries’ power. One of the main objectives of the
rational struggle for freedom is to disarm reactionaries by exposing the illusionary
character of their power” (People in Trouble).
The main problem with compromising is not so much moral as practical: it’s
difficult to attack something when we ourselves are implicated in it. We hedge our
critiques lest others criticize us in turn. It becomes harder to think big, to act boldly.
As has often been noted, many of the German people acquiesced to Nazi oppression because
it began fairly gradually and was at first directed mainly at unpopular minorities (Jews,
Gypsies, Communists, homosexuals); by the time it began affecting the general population,
they had become incapable of doing anything about it.
In hindsight it’s easy to condemn those who capitulated to fascism or Stalinism,
but it’s unlikely that most of us would have done any better had we been in the same
position. In our daydreams, picturing ourself as a dramatic personage faced with a
clear-cut choice in front of an appreciative audience, we imagine that we would have no
trouble making the right decision. But the situations we actually face are usually more
complex and obscure. It’s not always easy to know where to draw the line.
The point is to draw it somewhere, stop worrying about guilt and blame and
self-justification, and take the offensive.
This spirit is well exemplified by those Italian workers who have gone on strike
without making any demands whatsoever. Such strikes are not only more interesting than the
usual bureaucratic union negotiations, they may even be more effective: the bosses,
uncertain of how far they have to go, frequently end up offering much more than the
strikers would have dared to demand. The latter can then decide on their next move without
having committed themselves to anything in return.
A defensive reaction against this or that social symptom at best wins some temporary
concession on the specific issue. Aggressive agitation that refuses to limit itself exerts
far more pressure. Faced with widespread, unpredictable movements like the sixties
counterculture or the May 1968 revolt — movements calling everything in question,
generating autonomous contestations on many fronts, threatening to spread throughout the
whole society and too vast to be controlled by cooptable leaders — rulers hasten to
clean up their image, pass reforms, raise wages, release prisoners, declare amnesties,
initiate peace talks — anything in the hope of preempting the movement and
reestablishing their control. (The sheer unmanageability of the American counterculture,
which was spreading deeply into the army itself, probably played as great a role as the
explicit antiwar movement in forcing the end of the Vietnam war.)
The side that takes the initiative defines the terms of the struggle. As long as it
keeps innovating, it also retains the element of surprise. “Boldness is virtually a
creative power. . . . Whenever boldness meets hesitation it already has a
significant advantage because the very state of hesitation implies a loss of equilibrium.
It is only when it encounters cautious foresight that it is at a disadvantage”
(Clausewitz, On War). But cautious foresight is quite rare among those who run
this society. Most of the system’s processes of commodification, spectacularization
and hierarchization are blind and automatic: merchants, media and leaders merely follow
their natural tendencies to make money or grab audiences or recruit followers.
Spectacle society is often the victim of its own falsifications. As each level of
bureaucracy tries to cover for itself with padded statistics, as each “information
source” outbids the others with more sensational stories, and as competing states,
governmental departments and private companies each launch their own independent
disinformation operations (see chapters 16 and 30 of Debord’s Comments on the
Society of the Spectacle), even the exceptional ruler who may have some lucidity has
a hard time finding out what is really happening. As Debord observes elsewhere in the same
book, a state that ends up repressing its own historical knowledge can no longer conduct
itself strategically.
“The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all concessions
yet made to her august claims have been born of struggle. . . . If there is
no struggle there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and yet deprecate
agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain without
thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters. The
struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a physical one; or it may be both moral and
physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did
and it never will.”
—Frederick Douglass
Anyone with any knowledge of history is aware that societies do not change without
stubborn and often savage resistance by those in power. If our ancestors had not resorted
to violent revolt, most of those who now self-righteously deplore it would still be serfs
or slaves.
The routine functioning of this society is far more violent than any reaction against
it could ever be. Imagine the outrage that would greet a radical movement that executed
20,000 opponents; that’s a conservative estimate of the number of children that the
present system allows to starve to death each day. Vacillations and compromises
allow this ongoing violence to drag on indefinitely, ultimately causing a thousand times
more suffering than a single decisive revolution.
Fortunately a modern, genuinely majority revolution would have relatively little need
for violence except to neutralize those elements of the ruling minority who try to
violently maintain their own power.
Violence is not only undesirable in itself, it generates panic (and thus
manipulability) and promotes militaristic (and thus hierarchical) organization.
Nonviolence entails more open and democratic organization; it tends to foster composure
and compassion and to break the miserable cycle of hatred and revenge.
But we have to avoid making a fetish out of it. The common retort, “How can you
work for peace with violent methods?” is no more logical than it would be to tell a
drowning man that if he wants to get to dry land he must avoid touching water. Striving to
resolve “misunderstandings” through dialogue, pacifists forget that some
problems are based on objective conflicts of interest. They tend to underestimate the
malice of enemies while exaggerating their own guilt, berating themselves even for their
“violent feelings.” The seemingly personal practice of “bearing
witness” actually reduces the activist to a passive object, “another person for
peace” who (like a soldier) puts her body on the line while abdicating personal
investigation or experimentation. Those who want to undermine the notion of war as
exciting and heroic must get beyond such a cringing, beggarly notion of peace. Defining
their objective as survival, peace activists have had little to say to those who are
fascinated by global annihilation precisely because they are sick of an everyday life
reduced to mere survival, who see war not as a threat but as a welcome deliverance from a
life of boredom and constant petty anxiety.
Sensing that their purism would not hold up under the test of reality, pacifists
usually remain deliberately ignorant about past and present social struggles. Though often
capable of intensive study and stoic self-discipline in their personal spiritual
practices, they seem to feel that a Reader’s Digest level of historical and
strategical knowledge will suffice for their ventures into “social engagement.”
Like someone hoping to eliminate injurious falls by abolishing the law of gravity, they
find it simpler to envision a never-ending moral struggle against “greed,”
“hatred,” “ignorance,” “bigotry,” than to challenge the
specific social structures that actually reinforce such qualities. If pressed, they
sometimes complain that radical contestation is a very stressful terrain. It is indeed,
but this is a strange objection to hear from those whose spiritual practices claim to
enable people to confront problems with detachment and equanimity.
There’s a wonderful moment in Uncle Tom’s Cabin: As a Quaker family
is helping some slaves escape to Canada, a Southern slave catcher appears. One of the
Quakers points a shotgun at him and says, “Friend, thee isn’t wanted here.”
I think that’s just the right tone: not caught up in hatred, or even contempt, but
ready to do what is necessary in a given situation.
Reactions against oppressors are understandable, but those who get too caught up in
them risk becoming mentally as well as materially enslaved, chained to their masters by
“bonds of hate.” Hatred of bosses is partly a projection of people’s
self-hatred for all the humiliations and compromises they have accepted, stemming from
their secret awareness that bosses ultimately exist only because the bossed put up with
them. Even if there is some tendency for the scum to rise to the top, most people in
positions of power don’t act much differently than would anyone else who happened to
find themselves in the same position, with the same new interests, temptations and fears.
Vigorous retaliation may teach enemy forces to respect you, but it also tends to
perpetuate antagonisms. Forgiveness sometimes wins over enemies, but in other cases it
simply gives them a chance to recover and strike again. It’s not always easy to
determine which policy is best in which circumstances. People who have suffered under
particularly vicious regimes naturally want to see the perpetrators punished; but too much
revenge sends a message to other present and future oppressors that they may as well fight
to the death since they have nothing to lose.
But most people, even those who have been most blamably complicitous with the system,
will tend to go whichever way the wind blows. The best defense against counterrevolution
is not to be preoccupied with sniffing out people’s past offenses or potential future
betrayals, but to deepen the insurgence to the point that everyone is drawn in.
[FOOTNOTES]
1. The SI’s dissemination of a text denouncing an international
gathering of art critics in Belgium was a fine example of this: “Copies were mailed
to a large number of critics or given to them personally. Others were telephoned and read
all or part of the text. A group forced its way into the Press Club where the critics were
being received and threw the leaflets among the audience. Others were tossed onto the
sidewalks from upstairs windows or from a car. . . . In short, all steps were
taken to leave the critics no chance of being unaware of the text.” (SI
Anthology, p. 49 [Revised Edition pp. 60-61] [Action in Belgium].)
2. “The absence of a revolutionary movement in Europe has
reduced the Left to its simplest expression: a mass of spectators who swoon with rapture
each time the exploited in the colonies take up arms against their masters, and who cannot
help seeing these uprisings as the epitome of Revolution. . . . Wherever there
is a conflict they always see Good fighting Evil, ‘total revolution’ versus
‘total reaction.’ . . . Revolutionary criticism begins beyond good and evil; it
is rooted in history and operates on the totality of the existing world. In no case can it
applaud a belligerent state or support the bureaucracy of an exploitive state in
the process of formation. . . . It is obviously impossible at present to seek a revolutionary
solution to the Vietnam war. It is first of all necessary to put an end to the American
aggression in order to allow the real social struggle in Vietnam to develop in a natural
way; i.e. to allow the Vietnamese workers and peasants to rediscover their enemies at
home: the bureaucracy of the North and the propertied and ruling strata of the South. Once
the Americans withdraw, the Stalinist bureaucracy will seize control of the whole country
— there’s no getting around this. . . . The point is not to give
unconditional (or even conditional) support to the Vietcong, but to struggle consistently
and uncompromisingly against American imperialism.” (SI Anthology, pp.
195-196, 203 [Revised Edition pp. 252-253, 262] [Two Local Wars].)
3. “In its mystified form, dialectics became the fashion in
Germany because it seemed to transfigure and glorify the existing state of things. In its
rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgeois society and its doctrinaire
professors, because in comprehending the existing state of things it simultaneously
recognizes the negation of that state, its inevitable breaking up; because it sees the
fluid movement of every historically developed social form, and therefore takes into
account its transience as well as its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose
on it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.” (Marx, Capital.)
The split between Marxism and anarchism crippled both sides. The anarchists rightly
criticized the authoritarian and narrowly economistic tendencies in Marxism, but they
generally did so in an undialectical, moralistic, ahistorical manner, contraposing various
absolute dualisms (Freedom versus Authority, Individualism versus Collectivism,
Centralization versus Decentralization, etc.) and leaving Marx and a few of the more
radical Marxists with a virtual monopoly on coherent dialectical analysis — until the
situationists finally brought the libertarian and dialectical aspects back together again.
On the merits and flaws of Marxism and anarchism see The
Society of the Spectacle §§78-94.
4. “What surfaced this spring in Zurich as a demonstration
against the closing of a youth center has crept across Switzerland, feeding on the
restlessness of a young generation anxious to break out of what they see as a suffocating
society. ‘We don’t want a world where the guarantee of not dying of hunger is
paid for by the certainty of dying of boredom,’ proclaim banners and spray-painted
storefronts in Lausanne.” (Christian Science Monitor, 28 October 1980.) The
slogan is from Vaneigem’s The Revolution of Everyday Life.
5. For some hilarious examples see Henry Beard and Christopher
Cerf’s The Official Politically Correct Dictionary and Handbook (Villard,
1992): it’s often hard to tell which of the Correctspeak terms are satirical and
which have actually been seriously proposed or even officially adopted and enforced. The
only antidote to such delirium is a lot of healthy guffaws.
End of Chapter 2 of “The Joy of Revolution,” from Public Secrets:
Collected Skirmishes of Ken Knabb (1997).
- Chapter 1: Some Facts of Life
- Utopia or bust. Stalinist “communism” and reformist “socialism” are
merely variants of capitalism. Representative democracy versus delegate democracy.
Irrationalities of capitalism. Some exemplary modern revolts. Some common objections.
Increasing dominance of the spectacle.
-
- Chapter 3: Climaxes
- Causes of social breakthroughs. Postwar upheavals. Effervescence of radical situations.
Popular self-organization. The situationists in May 1968. Workerism is obsolete,
but workers’ position remains pivotal. Wildcats and sitdowns. Consumer strikes. What
could have happened in May 1968. Methods of confusion and cooption. Terrorism reinforces
the state. The ultimate showdown. Internationalism.
-
- Chapter 4: Rebirth
- Utopians fail to envision postrevolutionary diversity. Decentralization and
coordination. Safeguards against abuses. Consensus, majority rule and unavoidable
hierarchies. Eliminating the roots of war and crime. Abolishing money. Absurdity of most
present-day labor. Transforming work into play. Technophobic objections. Ecological
issues. The blossoming of free communities. More interesting problems.
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